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Introduction 
 
Alexander the Great of Macedonia (356-323) is perhaps the best known secular 
figure of antiquity. Acceding to the throne aged twenty in 336, in thirteen years he forged 
an empire that stretched from Greece and Macedonia in the west to India in the east, and 
its collapse drastically altered the political and intellectual spectrum of the Near East. The 
construction of this Macedonian Empire led Alexander and his army to the edges of the 
world; they travelled farther and for a longer time than any Greek army before them, 
spreading Hellenic culture in their wake.  
Given the extent of Alexander’s influence and the number of works written about 
him in antiquity, it is astounding that not one  contemporary source survives intact; all are 
fragmentary. The only extant intact histories of Alexander’s reign were written centuries 
after his death and under Roman influence by Diodorus Siculus (1
st
 century BCE), 
Pompeius Trogus (epitomized by Justin in the 2
nd
 century CE ), Quintus Curtius Rufus 
(1
st
 century CE), and Arrian (2
nd
 century CE). To these we can add the 1-2
nd
 century 
biographer Plutarch, who wrote a biography of Alexander. The way in which these later 
authors used the earlier (now mostly lost) sources is unknown, and for this reason their 
accounts should be treated with caution.
1
 Nevertheless, without them it would be 
impossible to proceed in the study of Alexander, and many of the obstacles the sources 
present may be overcome through consideration of credibility, purpose, and by presenting 
a reader with variations of an account.  
                                                 
1
 See E. Baynham, “The Ancient Sources for Alexander the Great,” Brill’s Companion to Alexander the 
Great ed. J. Roisman (Leiden: Brill, 2003): 1-29; A.B. Bosworth, From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in 
Historical Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).  
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  It is the nature of the ancient sources to center their reports on Alexander or his 
generals, making the perspectives of unranked men, the majority of the campaign’s 
participants, difficult to determine. Such is the general state of accounts of war 
throughout history, but in his 1976 work The Face of Battle Keegan has shown that it is 
possible to reconstruct some degree of the common soldier’s experience.2 By considering 
the points of view of all participants in a battle, Keegan offered a fresh understanding of 
war through three case studies from between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Hanson followed in his footsteps by reconstructing the experience of the ancient Greek 
hoplite soldier in his The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece.
3
 In 
my thesis, I attempt to use a similar methodology on a smaller scale to investigate the 
type and acceleration of violence in Alexander’s army, aspects of his campaign in the 
East that bear further scrutiny.  
The Macedonian invasion of Bactria, Sogdiana, and India in the latter half of the 
campaign stands out as distinct from operations in West Asia, the traditional Persian 
Empire. The degree of slaughter involved in the conquest and occupation of these lands is 
emphasized in the ancient sources and used by some modern historians as a basis for 
forming a “new…orthodoxy”4  in order to combat the romanticized Alexander of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, I do not think that something as 
complex as human brutality can be easily explained, and attributing the rise of violence to 
                                                 
2
 J. Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme (London: Penguin Books, 
1983).  
3
 V. Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994).  
4
 P. Briant, Alexander the Great and His Empire, trans. A. Kuhrt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010), 140. 
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Alexander’s personality or suggesting that “killing was what he did best” is not 
sufficient.
5
 Rather, the causes of heightened violence are numerous, multifaceted, and 
unique to time and location.  
In my thesis, I argue that the rise in carnage and incidence of massacre in 
Alexander’s eastern campaigns stems from a combination of waging a foreign war, 
policy and native response to it, and a drop in army morale. In Bactria and Sogdiana, the 
Macedonian army faced guerilla warfare for the first time, a mode of fighting which 
stood in opposition to the traditional Greek rules of war (see chapter 1). In India, the 
frequent sieges and the difficulty of forcing pitched battle further complicated the attempt 
at waging a Western war in and on Eastern land.  Alexander’s policy of settling the land 
and maintaining a static population resulted in stronger insurgency in Bactria and 
Sogdiana, which had only been loosely controlled by Persia in the past. In India, a strong 
local sense of autonomy, especially among the Brahman caste, made opposition to 
Macedonian rule sharper and led to Alexander’s policy of no resistance, in which a 
refusal of surrender was treated as rebellion. The chronology of the campaign is 
significant, as the apex of violence in India could not have occurred without two years of 
arduous fighting in Bactria and Sogdiana. War-weariness is a convenient but ultimately 
insufficient word to describe the extremity of cultural isolation, low level of moral, and 
sheer physical and psychological exhaustion that the Macedonians experienced in their 
easternmost campaigns. The army’s refusal to continue beyond the Hyphasis River after 
eight years of combat is evidence of this intense fatigue.  The violence that resulted from 
these campaigns cannot be directly linked to any one factor or individual, but a 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., 61 discusses and quotes from Bosworth, Alexander and the East, v.  
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combination of circumstance and environment and the manner in which both affected the 
army.  
In the following work, I set out what may be loosely termed the Greek “rules of 
war” as they were in the Archaic and Classical Periods and discuss both pitched battles 
and sieges (Chapter 1). In the second chapter, I discuss Alexander’s and his father 
Philip’s adherence to these rules and their modifications to warfare which altered the 
manner, but not the spirit, of Greek battle. The bulk of this thesis deals with Bactria and 
Sogdiana (Chapter 3) and India (Chapter 4), which I argue contributed directly to the rise 
in the army’s brutality and weariness. Those chapters are subtitled and organized 
thematically rather than chronologically in order to discuss relevant issues. A brief 
conclusion summarizes my views. 
Most spelling takes the traditional, Latin form, with the exception of specific All 
dates are B.C.E. unless otherwise noted.   
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Chapter 1: The Greek Rules of War  
 
The life of Alexander the Great (356-323) comprised the last years of the 
Classical Period (479-323) of the Greco-Macedonian world, and his reign proved a 
turning point in the history of Greek warfare. Throughout most of the Archaic and 
Classical eras, war had a particular form, and there existed a set of “rules” or traditional 
practices by which armies operated. There was no comprehensive manual of war such as 
the sixth century Chinese had in Sun Tzu’s Art of War, which offers instruction on 
integral facets of warfare such as logistics, stratagems, and incendiary attacks.
6
 Greek 
soldiers were educated in war according to the traditions of their poleis, and the set of 
statutes which emerged in common throughout Greece was likely due to frequent intra-
polis fighting, not canonized military texts.  The Greeks did not have any all-
encompassing law, written or understood, that governed just and unjust warfare in the 
way St. Thomas Aquinas’ thirteenth century Summa Theologica does.7  The concept of 
just war and a “fair” fight must be distinguished through observation of the Greek 
practice of war, as the Greek “rules” were a collective ideal and goal, and naturally there 
were exceptions to them and cases in which poleis diverged from the norm.  
By the time of Alexander, many of the period’s technological and strategic 
conventions had been modified,
8
 but Alexander and his army cleaved to basic Greek 
                                                 
6
 The date of Sun Tzu’s work, and indeed the historicity of Sun Tzu himself, are uncertain. See a general 
discussion in Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. R. Sawyer (Boulder: West View Press, 1994). 
7
 Summa Theologica 2.2.Q40 
8
 For a summary of the modification and evolution of hoplite tactics and armor, see L Rawlings, “War and 
Warfare in Ancient Greece” in The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 21-4.  
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traditions in war throughout their campaign in Persia. It was not until the Macedonian 
invasion of Bactria and Sogdiana that the conventional form of warfare changed to 
combat unfamiliar enemies. The most comprehensive study of traditional Greek warfare 
is still Pritchett’s The Greek State at War, and what follows consists of a summary of the 
most pertinent elements of Greek warfare for my thesis.
9
 
 
I. Greek Warfare 
 Pitched Battle 
 
War for the Greeks was brutal and personal, and it ideally hinged on a decisive 
pitched battle, either on land or sea. Although the Greeks did engage in skirmishing and 
sieges, an unquestionable victory in battle was preferable because it was definitive and of 
short duration.
10
 Sieges had the potential to last much longer and prove more costly in 
manpower and resources; further, they did not permit a confrontation between warrior 
and warrior, but between warrior and wall. It is not surprising that the most famous Greek 
siege, the decade-long siege of Troy, was described by Homer primarily in terms of 
personal, hand-to-hand combat between Bronze Age heroes. This gruesomely intimate 
                                                 
9
 See Pritchett, The Greek State at War I-V. The present study does not include a discussion of naval 
warfare, a significant element of both Classical and Hellenistic military history, because Alexander’s 
eastern campaigns were all fought by land battles. For an examination of naval warfare see Rawlings, 
Ancient Greeks at War, 104-27, and  P. Souza, “War at Sea” in The Oxford Handbook of Warfare, 367-82. 
10
 Battles normally ceased when the sun set. For a brief description and detailed table of battle duration, see 
Pritchett, Greek State at War IV, 46-51. 
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nature of battle remained a key component of Greek war even as the arrangement of 
troops and technology evolved.
11
   
Perhaps the preference for pitched battle and short-term, if extreme, violence, 
stemmed from the Greek tradition of citizen soldiers, the majority of whom were land-
owners and farmers, who could not devote an extended amount of time to war.
12
 There 
was a need for a manner of determining a distinct victor which would not result in 
prolonged campaigning. The consequence was the development of hoplite warfare, which 
predominated in Greece from the eighth to sixth centuries and continued down in 
modified form through the Hellenistic period.
13
 A hoplite was generally a land-owning 
citizen who furnished his own armor when called into duty for the defense of his polis.
14
 
Hoplite battles were almost formulaic encounters between two armies. Smoothing off the 
battlefield beforehand, heavily-armored soldiers met in phalanx formation, a solid square 
of men whose numbers could vary.
15
 Each hoplite carried a shield, a spear, and a short 
sword, which were generally used in that order.
16
 During the advance, troops crashed 
against one another and leaned their weight into their shields while stabbing outward with 
                                                 
11
 Hanson, Western Way of War, xxiv, 12-13, 40-44. On earlier arrangements of troops in Homeric war, see 
Pritchett, Greek State at War IV, 7-32. 
12
 V. Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998), 1-16 and Western Way of War, 1-9. 
13
 Hanson, Western Way of War, xxvi; Rawlings, “War and Warfare in Ancient Greece” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Warfare, 21. For an argument in favor of an Homeric predecessor of pitched hoplite battle, 
see Pritchett, Greek State at War IV, 7-33. 
14
 For further discussion of hoplite warfare, weapons, and reform see: A. Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour 
and Weapons (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1964); P. Krentz, “The Nature of Hoplite Battles” 
Classical Antiquity 4, no. 1 (1985): 50-61; H. van Wees, Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities (London: 
Gerald Duckworth & Co., 2004); D. Kagan and G. Viggiano (eds) Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in 
Ancient Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).  
15
 Rawlings, “War and Warfare in Ancient Greece,” 18. J. Lee, “The Classical Greek Experience,” in 
Oxford Handbook, 152-7. See also for a discussion of battlefield procedure and armor Hanson, Western 
Way of War, 27-39; 55-88. 
16
 For arms and armor see Hanson, Western Way of War, 55-88. Lee, “The Classical Greek Experience,” 
147-9. Rawlings, Ancient Greeks at War, 45-8. 
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their spears. This point of battle was called an othismos, or “push,” and it eventually 
dissolved into hand-to-hand combat.
17
  The phalanx formation allowed for a 
“concentration of warfare” which permitted an army to cut down a large percentage of its 
enemy and decide a victor with finality; the goal was to eliminate as large a percentage of 
the enemy as possible and win the field.
18
 In order to facilitate this, armies would often 
wait for their opponents to line up and prepare, and “battles normally began when both 
sides were ready;” this process occasionally led to several days of waiting in order to 
ensure a concentration of force.
19
  
The “concentration of warfare” was the goal of the Spartan king Agesilaus at the 
Battle of Mantinea in 362. The king encamped outside the walls of the eponymous town 
and avoided separate conflicts between his enemies, the Arcadians and the Argives, in 
order to await the time when they might combine forces so that he could defeat them 
altogether. Agesilaus wished to fight his enemies en masse and ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου καì 
φανεροῦ (“in regular fashion and in the open”) in order to render any defeat utterly 
decisive.
20
 Decades later at Chaeronea in 338, Philip II also sought a single, decisive 
pitched battle. Because he was able to defeat a coalition of the most powerful Greek 
poleis led by Athens and Thebes, Philip swiftly won control of Greece.
21
 The hint of 
artificiality involved in the planning of a pitched battle, which often involved seeking out 
a preferred battle site in advance and aiming for decisive casualties, characterized even 
                                                 
17
 The use of this word is debated by scholars, as it is uncertain whether an othismos refers to a literal 
contest of pushing, shield-to-shield along the front line, or is merely used as a metaphor for the first contact 
of troops. Hanson argues for the literal meaning (Western Way of War 28-9; 169-70).  
18
Hanson, Western Way of War, 225; see also 12-18. Pritchett, Greek State at War IV, 65-73.  
19
 Pritchett, Greek State at War II, 148-9.  
20
 Xen. Hell. 6.5.16. Hanson, Western Way of War, 17.  
21
 Worthington, Philip II, 147-51. 
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the Persian Wars. Herodotus wrote that the Persian general Mardonius claimed that the 
Greeks had “absurd notions of warfare” (7.9.2). Perhaps Herodotus meant to imply that 
after Mardonius’ total defeat at Plataea (479), the general better understood the logic of 
Greek war and the need to render a defeat so conclusive that further attacks would not be 
attempted.  
Logic was not the only significant element of war, however. Large-scale pitched 
battles also allowed a demonstration of andreia, or manliness, and they often served as a 
turning point in war if not a decisive resolution altogether. It is not surprising that these 
feats, rather than skirmishes, were more commonly lauded and appreciated by the 
Greeks. The Persian Wars from Marathon to Mycale (490-479) consisted of pitched 
battles on land and at sea which served as a touchstone for Greek honor and valor well 
into the Classical period.
22
 However, the Greeks were more frequently at war with one 
another than with invading enemies, and their means of making war on other poleis 
varied. The battles and skirmishes of the Peloponnesian War (431-404), being both so 
numerous and spread over a duration of almost three decades, might prove more 
representative of the everyday reality of Greek warfare. Conflicts of this period consisted 
of seasonal raids, skirmishes, sieges, naval battles, and pitched battles, all of which 
hoplites were capable of doing.  
                                                 
22
 Classical period theatre like Aeschylus’ Persians lauds both the victors of the Persian Wars (in this case, 
the Athenians at Salamis) as well as the superiority of their method of war and discipline (Bruce LaForse, 
“Fighting the Other Part I” in Oxford Handbook, 575-8). Thucydides calls the wars “the greatest 
achievement of former times” (1.23.1).   
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Set battles, however, were not always the reality.
23
  Rawlings claims that the 
notion of Greek agonal warfare is entirely a modern construct because of the recorded 
frequency of other types of combat: “ambushes, deceptive stratagems, bloody pursuits, 
and massacres.”24 It seems more likely that agonal warfare and the face-to-face combat 
which Hanson describes was the Greek ideal,
 25
 but circumstances did not always permit 
one army to force another into battle, and occasionally ruses were preferable. Although 
ambuscades and surprise attacks were used by the Greeks, they were comparatively 
infrequent, as the distance between two hoplite armies was usually not great enough to 
allow for such measures.
26
 Ambuscades are not associated with dishonor in Homer, but 
Pritchett argues that the Greeks saw trickery as “a violation of the ancient sense of 
military honor.”27 
The inclination to engage in direct combat was strong. During the Archidamian 
War (431-421), Pericles specifically exhorted the Athenians not to allow their pride to 
overpower them when the Spartans ravaged the countryside, knowing that if the citizens 
yielded to pitched battle, they were likely to lose.
28
 But then as today, there was often a 
gap between what was preferable in battle and what was necessary. Thucydides indirectly 
expressed this discontinuity between the ideal and the reality through the Spartan general 
Brasidas, who gave his soldiers contradictory advice. Facing an Illyrian assault, Brasidas 
                                                 
23
 See Lee, “The Classical Greek Experience,” in Oxford Handbook of Warfare, 157-9.  
24
 Rawlings, “War and Warfare in Ancient Greece,” in Oxford Handbook of Warfare, 9.  
25
 Hanson,  Western Way of War, 14-16. 
26
 Pritchett, Greek State at War II, 156-60. 
27
 Ibid, 178-9. Pritchett cites the association of bravery and ambush in Homer through speeches by Achilles 
(Il. 1.227), Idomeneus (Il. 13.277), Priam (Il. 24.779), and Odysseus (Od. 14.217). He contrasts this 
Homeric perspective with the later Greeks described by Polybius (4.8.11) who are opposite the Cretans 
with respect to ambuscades, and do not engage in them.  
28
 Thuc. 2.13. Cf. Hanson, Western Way of War, 81, 125.  
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deprecated tricks and evasion: “rather than meet you in close fighting, [the Illyrians] 
think it safer to make you frightened and to run no risks themselves” and they “only make 
threats…keeping well out of the way themselves” despite their behavior being 
“alarming…to the eye and to the ear.”29 However, at the Battle of Amphipolis (424), 
Brasidas praises deception, claiming that “it is by these unorthodox methods that one 
wins the greatest glory; they completely deceive the enemy” (Thuc. 5.9). The use of 
stratagems and deception was not the Greek ideal, but because it often proved more 
useful in a situation than direct confrontation, it was a distinct facet of Greek war. Indeed, 
it was through a stratagem that the Spartan general Lysander won the Peloponnesian War 
at the Battle of Aegospotami (405). Lysander watched enemy Athenian ships line up and 
offer battle for four consecutive days, each time refusing to bring his own fleet out to 
meet them so that the Athenians did not believe him willing to fight. On the fifth day, 
when the Athenians beached their ships, Lysander pursued and caught them half-manned, 
wiping out his enemy’s naval force.30 
Post-battle behavior was also of great importance. The raising of trophies and 
stripping of the dead had deep roots by the Classical period, and the latter recurs with 
great frequency in the Iliad.
31
 Both of these practices clarified the victor of the battle, 
allowing the army which had won the field to claim it and take prizes from the slain in 
the form of armor, weapons, and likely whatever other objects of value the dead had upon 
                                                 
29
 Thuc. 4.126. Cf. Hanson, Western Way of War, 13.  
30
 Xen. Hell. 2.1.20-8. R. Moore, “Generalship: Leadership and Command,” in Oxford Handbook of War, 
462. See Pritchett, Greek State at War II, 180-3 for an extensive list of instances of Greek ambuscade.  
31
 Some of the most notable examples are upon the deaths of the Trojan Sarpedon and the Myrmidon 
Patroclus (Il.16.531-4, 16.696-8; 17.123).  
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them.
32
 Thucydides describes this process in the wake of the Battle of Solgyeia (425/4): 
after the Athenians forced the Corinthians from the field, they were able to claim it, both 
putting up a trophy and stripping the dead, whose bodies were not defiled, but generally 
given over to the survivors of the losing side (4.43-4).
33
 
Battlefield trophies are a point of great significance, as they demonstrate the role 
of the honor/shame dichotomy in Greek warfare and society and how pitched battle was 
the traditional venue through which one’s marshal prowess was expressed. While the 
victors made their triumph public by physical display, for those who lost (and survived), 
defeat may have “involved humiliation and a recognition of martial inferiority.”34 It is 
significant that a war trophy could only be set up after a conflict involving direct contact, 
even if it amounted to no more than a skirmish. The Greeks used trophies frequently, but 
Pausanius claims that it was not Macedonian tradition to establish war trophies. As 
Pritchett points out, this is blatantly untrue. Diodorus’ accounts contradict those of 
Pausanias in several cases, the most famous of which is Philip II’s statue of a lion at 
Chaeronea, set up to honor the fallen Sacred Band of Thebes. Anyone observing the 
statue, then as today, is reminded of both the band and of the king who defeated it.
35
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Rawlings, Ancient Greeks at War, 98-9.  
33
 Philip II did not follow this custom after his victory at the Battle of Chaeronea (338), when he ransomed 
the bodies of the fallen Thebans (except for members of the Sacred Band) and sold the prisoners into 
slavery. See further:  I. Worthington, Philip II, 154.  
34
 Ibid, 99, 193. See Pritchett, Greek State at War II, 264-9 for a chart which details the construction of war 
trophies in the histories.  
35
 Diod. 16.86.6; 16.88.2; also Philip against Bardylis in Diod. 16.4.7; Pausanias 9.40.7-9. On Greek use of 
trophies see: Prichett, Greek State at War II, 262-3; 270-1. 
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Siege Warfare 
 
Siege warfare was also used by the Greeks, and the variety of terminology ancient 
authors use to mean “besiege” suggests that it was a common form of combat.36 Sieges 
tested a general’s ingenuity and a soldier’s patience and did not allow the hand-to-hand 
combat that the Greeks preferred; rather, sieges mandated the use of projectiles and 
combat at a distance, involving archers and slingers. “Those who fight from afar” were 
capable of destroying an enemy without ever meeting him face to face, and they were a 
“universal object of disdain in Greek literature.”37 Siege combat may not have been the 
most glorious method of war, but it was often a necessary means of defeating an enemy, 
and it became more common in Greece during the fifth century at the time of Athens’ 
imperialistic expansion.
38
 By the fourth century, Philip II and Alexander the Great both 
conducted a number of sieges, altering the nature of Greek warfare.  
Seaman disagrees with the earlier theory that the preference for pitched battle 
began to disintegrate during the Peloponnesian War, when a large-scale and protracted 
war led to the accumulation of multiple enemies. The option of deciding the entire war in 
a few land and naval battles, like the Persian Wars, was not viable. Seaman emphasizes 
that siege warfare and the atrocities which accompanied it predated even this large-scale 
civil war.
39
 During the period Thucydides calls the pentecontaetia (479-431), Seaman 
                                                 
36
 M. Seaman, “The Peloponnesian War and Its Sieges” in Oxford Handbook of Warfare, 642 n.1.  
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shows 30 city-states that were besieged, and during the 27-year Peloponnesian War at 
least 100 sieges were undertaken, over half successfully.
40
 Perhaps the reason sieges are 
less conspicuous in written histories than pitched battle is because they are generally not 
remembered or especially revered unless they attract attention for an unusual duration, 
level of violence, or method of capture. The most famous siege of the ancient world is 
unquestionably Troy, but during the Classical period the siege of Athens at the end of the 
Peloponnesian War was likely the best known because it led to the collapse of an empire 
(404). Among Alexander’s campaigns, the sieges of Tyre (333-332), Aornus (327), and 
Malli (325) are the most famous for violence, (technological innovations, a facet of war 
that advanced considerably under Philip and Alexander and well into the Hellenistic 
period), and in the case of Tyre, duration.
41
 
 A siege was prosecuted either by direct assault or circumvallation, the process of 
walling up a city and blockading it. The latter was often a protracted and costly endeavor 
which led a city to surrender through starvation. Direct assault was preferable.
42
 In some 
cases however, quick sieges and temporary captures of minor forts involved the labor of 
ravaging the surrounding land to agitate the enemy and little else; occasionally a skirmish 
could be induced. Such was the case for the Athenians at Pheia in Elis in 431 (Thuc. 
2.25), and at Thronium in the same year, where the Athenian general Cleopompus 
ravaged the land, took hostages, and departed (2.26). Hostages might be taken to secure a 
city or region after a siege, as the Spartan Eurylochus did at Hyaea (Thuc. 3.101), or 
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inhabitants could be removed and displaced, as at Polichna in 411 by the Athenians 
(Thuc. 8.23), but the direst of terms appear to have been imposed only after particular 
cases. 
There were no laws regulating a victor’s treatment of a city or citadel after a 
siege, but his disposition was likely most heavily influenced by long-standing enmity (or 
lack thereof) and most significantly, the cost of a siege, which involved the investment of 
finances, manpower, and often a great deal of time.
43
 The Corcyraeans’ siege of 
Epidamnus (433) ended with the enslavement of foreign troops and execution of all other 
prisoners because of Epidamnus’ earlier refusal to submit to an offer of clemency from its 
mother polis (Thuc 1.26-30). The siege of Thasos took Athens three years (468-465), and 
Thasos was punished by the destruction of its city walls and navy and total loss of 
autonomia (Thuc. 1.101). Samos, besieged by Athenian naval circumvallation for nine 
months, capitulated in 440 and suffered a similar fate, including the giving of hostages 
(Thuc. 1.117). The role of raiding is also alluded to in Thucydides’ account of Potidaea, 
which fell to the Athenians in 430/29 during the Peloponnesian war. Thucydides reports 
that the inhabitants “with their wives and children and auxiliary forces, were to be 
permitted to leave the town, the men to be allowed to take one garment apiece, the 
women two…[and] a fixed sum of money for their journey…wherever they could find a 
place to go” (2.70). The survivors were displaced and deprived of the majority of their 
wealth, and the implication is that the contents of the city fell to Athens.
44
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The aftermath of a siege was sometimes more dire, especially if it had been a long 
one. The Spartan siege of Plataea (429-427) cost the Spartans almost two years of labor, 
with the result that they imposed andrapodismos, or the killing of all adult men and the 
enslavement of women and children.
45
 Some of the most famous uses of circumvallation, 
a lengthy process, occurred at Scione (423), Melos (415), and Syracuse (415-413).
46
 
Notably the first two, which ended in victory for Athens, also ended in andrapodismos 
for its enemies. Additionally, if a city fell after refusing surrender, the victors might 
destroy it. This could include looting, razing the city walls, or massacre, and “the sexual 
violation of women was largely a characteristic of siege warfare”47 even when the 
enslavement of the population was not an enforced penalty. Such total destruction of a 
city was both a punitive measure and preventative, in order to render other poleis less 
liable to hold out against the besieger. However, the terms which ended a siege depended 
entirely on the “disposition of those whose decision it was to negotiate the terms of 
surrender,”48 usually a general or, in Athens, the demos.  
The ability of a victor to behave capriciously is well illustrated in the consecutive 
sieges of Cedreiae and Lampsacus at the end of the Peloponnesian War. The two cities 
were allies of Athens and resisted when Lysander assaulted the walls. Although both 
cities were captured quickly by storm, the inhabitants of Cedreiae were enslaved, but 
those of Lampsacus were spared and only their goods were plundered (Xen. Hell. 2.1.15-
20). The fate of the city of Mytilene earlier in the war was equally dependent on the 
                                                 
45
 Thuc. 3.68. For a discussion of the Plataeans’ fate, see Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, 144-6.  
46
 Chaniotis, “Greeks Under Siege,” 645-6; Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, 147-9.  
47
 Ibid, 159. Cf. Rawlings, Ancient Greeks at War, 218-21. 
48
 Seaman, “Peloponnesian War and its Sieges,” 652. Cf. Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, 139 
  
17 
 
disposition of the Athenian demos; in 427, Mytilene’s revolt from the Delian League 
caused Athens to place it under the watch of a fleet while deciding its fate in the famous 
Mytilenean debates (Thuc. 3.1-6). After the Assembly agreed to put the male 
Mytileneans to death and enslave the women and children, the following day it convened 
again to dispute the correctness of that resolution due to a “sudden change of feeling” 
(Thuc. 3.36). The change in the people that led them to repeal the decision came just in 
time to prevent the execution or enslavement of an entire polis and revealed the power a 
victor had over the fate of his enemy.  
An assault on a city was not always only the decision of the general; often the 
frustration of the troops played a significant role, as a besieging army suffered projectile 
wounds and serious casualties through the process of penetrating the walls. Such was the 
case at the Athenian siege of Mende (423), where the gates of the town were opened 
during the fighting among its own inhabitants, and the Athenians under the general Nicias 
poured in before terms had been made or accepted. Thucydides says that the Athenians 
“sacked the town as though they had captured it by assault,” indicating that a sacking was 
acceptable only when a city refused terms (4.130). Further, Thucydides notes that “the 
generals found it difficult to restrain their troops from massacring the inhabitants” 
(4.130), even though the generals ultimately did not intend to punish the city. In the end, 
they only put to death those responsible for the revolt, but allowed the people of Mende 
to continue governing themselves as before. This overzealousness on the part of soldiers 
could lead to massacres which fell outside of the Greek idea of just war. In 413, the 
Thracian allies of Athens behaved similarly when they stormed the city of Mycalessus 
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and massacred the inhabitants, including a boys’ school, which was occupied at the time 
(Thuc. 7.29). Thucydides makes clear that this behavior was not in alignment with typical 
Greek war, classifying its perpetrators as “blood thirsty barbarians” and their action as “a 
disaster more complete than any, more sudden and more horrible” (7.29). Nevertheless, 
these troops were involved in Greek war because they had been recruited by Athens.  
The Greeks could be uncompromisingly cruel in war as well, after both battles 
and sieges. The fate of Melos, mentioned above, is perhaps the most famous example of 
this. In 415, the Athenians demanded loyalty of the formerly neutral Aegean island of 
Melos. The Athenian Assembly presented the Melians with an ultimatum, alliance and 
submission or andrapodismos, and then besieged Melos when its inhabitants refused to 
yield, inflicting punishment within the year.
49
 Andrapodismos was the most violent 
outcome of Greek war, mandating the execution of all military-aged males and the 
enslavement of women and children. While andrapodismos had been used before Melos, 
the Athenians’ behavior towards the Melians was exceptionally cruel in light of the polis’ 
neutrality and relative powerlessness in the war. Melos did not have the potential to 
become a significant enemy, and the Athenian response was markedly ruthless. A 
similarly excessive show of brutality occurred among Xenophon’s men after the Battle of 
Cunaxa (399), when they mutilated the bodies of the Persian dead, “unbidden save by 
their own impulse,” in order to inspire fear in the enemy.50 Both examples reveal the 
extremes which participants in a war (including non-combatants, as in the Athenian 
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Assembly) are capable of reaching. Philip and Alexander also exacted cruel penalties 
from the besieged, as we shall see in chapter two (pp. 24-5). Philip’s razed Olynthus in 
348 and allowed his men to massacre the city’s inhabitants, and Alexander inflicted 
andrapodismos on Thebes in 335 and crucifixion on Tyre (p.32).
51
   
Perhaps these explosions of violence were due to the gruesome nature of the 
Greek battle experience; both pitched battle and sieges were exhausting procedures. 
Hand-to-hand combat sapped even the best warrior of energy quickly due to the sheer 
effort of charging and fighting under 70 pounds of bronze and wood.
52
 Moreover, taking 
and dealing out blows was costly, and the effort of piercing an enemy’s protective gear 
and maintaining the force of the “push” or defending oneself, if the ranks had been 
broken, were strenuous tasks.
53
 It was typical for a Greek soldier not only to witness the 
“great bloodshed”54 of battle, but to be smattered with it as well. For this reason it is very 
rare that an army would have engaged in pitched battles back to back; the process was too 
draining, mentally and psychologically, to be managed regularly. This may also explain 
why the massacres which could occur after a long siege never occurred after a pitched 
battle.
55
 The experience was grisly, and even allowing for a greatly different mindset 
towards war and violence in antiquity, it must still have left a mark in a man’s memory to 
see friends or relatives cut down brutally beside him.
56
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Herodotus hints at the psychological impact of battle with his description of the 
Athenian soldier Epizelus at the Battle of Marathon (490), who faced a particularly 
terrifying enemy. Epizelus’ narrow escape from death resulted in permanent blindness 
(Hdt. 6.117), likely the effect of extreme hypertension resulting from fear. The fifth 
century sophist Gorgias described the madness and fear that those who experienced battle 
often underwent in his Encomium of Helen, a defense of Helen of Troy’s betrayal of 
Menelaus. Tritle posits that Gorgias was directing his defense at an audience of 
Peloponnesian War veterans, relying on such men’s understanding that the frightening 
elements of war can cause a person to do thoughtless things.
57
 While it is likely that 
ancient soldiers suffered psychological trauma in some cases after battle, it is difficult to 
extend the use of modern medical classifications like PTSD to ancient individuals as 
Tritle does. Tritle’s diagnosis of men such as the Spartan King Clearchus and even 
Alexander the Great involves the filtering of an ancient culture through a modern lens, 
and the true mental state of such individuals is ultimately unknowable.
58
 An assessment 
of war-weariness seems a more cautious approach than speculation on neurological 
damage. 
Displays of savagery like those discussed above likely occurred for Archaic and 
Classical Greek soldiers only once or twice, if at all, during a lifetime. The examples 
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discussed were selected from across the Greek world. The soldiers who executed Melian 
civilians were not the same men who mutilated Persian troops at Cunaxa or who 
massacred the Thebans. The frequency of violence in hoplite warfare is not comparable 
to Vietnam, where an untrained soldier might have fought more extensively in a week’s 
time than a practiced hoplite might have in his entire lifetime.
59
 The Peloponnesian War 
provided the most consecutive string of conflicts for one Greek army, and even those 
were somewhat divided, interspersed with periods of peace. Certainly the same men were 
not involved in successive sieges or battles and forced to undertake constant slaughter, 
although being rigorously trained.  
The circumstances of Alexander the Great’s army were different.  Alexander and 
his army marched from Macedonia in 334 to the banks of the Hyphasis (Beas) River in 
India by 326 and then back to Babylon by 323 in a decade. During that time the army 
fought four major pitched battles, prosecuted dozens of sieges, and engaged in guerilla 
warfare for the first time. Hanson notes that the traditional warfare of the Greeks was 
“guided by rules of engagement that often discouraged and deprecated ruse, ambush, 
night attack, and long, extended campaigns,” and the Macedonian expansion eastward 
pitted the army against all of these things. As I will discuss in the following chapters, the 
effect of a greater frequency of combat and of distinctly non-Greek practices was a rise in 
the savagery of battle and discontent among the troops, ultimately leading to Macedonian 
resistance. 
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II. Alexander in Persia 
Alexander’ Inheritance 
In eleven years (334-323), Alexander and his Macedonian army conquered a 
significant portion of the known world, expanding the Macedonian empire as far south as 
Egypt and as far East as the Punjab in India.
60
 Both king and army managed this through 
effort, endurance, and most significantly, innovation. Alexander was heir to two types of 
war: the traditional hoplite warfare of his ancestors discussed in the previous chapter, and 
the renovated, highly mobile and exceptionally lethal warfare of the Macedonian 
phalanx, the creation of Philip II (see below).  Philip’s reign marked a watershed in both 
Macedonian and Greek history because of his rapid expansion of, and revolutionary 
alterations to, the Macedonian army.  
Philip II of Macedonia was the youngest son of Amyntas III. During a twenty-
three year reign (359-336) he united Upper and Lower Macedonia, exploited the 
country’s natural resources, secured its borders, and perhaps most importantly he created 
the expertly trained army with which Alexander would conquer Asia.  Philip 
professionalized the army and did away with conscript civilian soldiers in favor of an 
expertly-trained army, who, unlike mercenaries, owed allegiance to the Argead line.
61
 
Philip expanded the size of his army through the incorporation of conquered neighbors, 
and some became specialist troops with expertise in javelin throwing or archery. All the 
soldiers went through rigorous training and frequent drilling in order to perfect 
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maneuvers whose precision would be crucial in battle. Macedonian battle formation, even 
during drills, must have been formidable, as Alexander was able to scare the Illyrian king 
Cleitus into withdrawing by ordering the Macedonians to run through their practice 
maneuvers (Arr.1.6. 1-4).  
Philip revolutionized weaponry as well. He created the sarissa, a pike that 
measured between 14-18 feet long and required both hands to wield. The sarissa gave the 
Macedonians the edge over a hoplite army, which would be stopped short by Philip’s 
front lines, which bristled with ten-inch points. Because of the compactness of the 
Macedonian phalanx, soldiers did not need the extensive body armor of their hoplite 
counterparts,
 62
 and this made troop formations very flexible. At Chaeronea (338), Philip 
ordered his phalanxes to retreat and then, when the enemy pursued them, the 
Macedonians were able to turn about, regain their momentum, and defeat the enemy.
63
 At 
Gaugamela (331) for example, Alexander’s phalanxes were able to separate and allow the 
Persians’ 200 scythed chariots to pass through their ranks without inflicting a great deal 
of damage.
64
  
The role of the cavalry in battle rose to prominence under Philip, becoming the 
main attack arm of the army, and it continued to dominate Alexander’s strategies as well. 
Because of its speed, the Macedonian cavalry took the offensive in battle and was used to 
carve openings in the enemy’s formation. Riders were armed with lances or sabers and 
pitted against infantrymen, and once cavalry entered the phalanx, breaking it up from 
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within could occur rather quickly. The significance of Philip’s reforms rests on his 
simultaneous use of infantry and cavalry, which allowed him to pin an enemy in place 
with infantry and assault its flanks with his cavalry.
65
 In doing so, Philip pioneered 
“shock and awe” tactics.  
Philip also presided over the advancement of siege technology which allowed him 
to conduct sieges fairly quickly, capturing six cities in under a year.
66
 Earlier sieges of the 
Classical period were often long and costly,
67
 but Philip’s development of a department 
of military engineering changed this practice; he made use of siege machinery like 
towers, rams, and the gastraphetes (“belly-shooter”) with the aid of engineers on-site. 
Philip’s use of the torsion catapult, first seen at the siege of Byzantium (340), allowed an 
army to break through fortified walls rather than merely launch projectiles at the 
defenders. 
Philip never made use of the Classical period custom of discussing the terms of a 
battle before an attack,
68
 but some facets of his war practices remained distinctly Greek. 
For example, the tight link between Greek religion and war was still in place. At the 
Battle of Crocus Field in 352, Philip ordered his troops to wear festal wreaths in honor of 
Apollo whose pillaged shrine had been the basis of the Third Sacred War (356-346).
69
 
Philip’s extreme treatment of Olynthus mentioned in chapter one (p.18) rested on a 
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religious pretext, as Olynthus had sworn and betrayed a religious oath of loyalty to 
Philip.
70
 The king also maintained the Greek practice of ransoming captives and 
exchanging the dead after a battle.
71
 Even Philip’s use of andrapodismos, as at the sieges 
of Sestus (353) and Olynthus (348), was not without precedent in Greek warfare, and 
generally Philip and Alexander both responded reasonably to cities which offered 
surrender.
72
 
The greatest change to Greek warfare under Philip and especially Alexander was 
the frequency and duration of campaigning. Philip’s men would have been able to return 
to Macedonia between expeditions, even though his army marched further and longer 
than any Greek ones. This was even more so with Alexander, whose troops covered 
thousands of miles in the East and whose respites were always in foreign locations.
73
 
Even during the twenty-seven year Peloponnesian War, troops returned to their respective 
poleis after an expedition and did not generally fight strings of sieges or battles in 
succession. The soldiers who fought the Peloponnesian War were citizens first, but the 
Macedonian army after Philip comprised professional soldiers. Such constant exposure to 
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war and rapid accrual of experience further altered the battle practices of the Macedonian 
army over time and became distinct from the behavior of a citizen soldier of a Greek 
polis, who would have spent less time in training and much less time experiencing war 
directly. This change was set into motion by Philip, who created an army with the 
potential for frequent action and brutal efficiency, and stretched to its limits by 
Alexander, who led the army in campaign as far as the banks of the Hyphasis and back to 
Babylon during a reign of thirteen years.  
 Alexander was already well-prepared for war even before he became king in 336 
aged 20.
 74
 In 340 aged 16 Alexander was regent and fought a battle against the Mardi on 
the upper Strymon River, in 338 aged 18 he fought with his father at Chaeronea, 
commanding the left wing and defeating the Theban Sacred Band. In 335, a year after he 
became king, The year he became king, he campaigned in Thrace and Illyria before 
moving south to subdue a revolt of Thebes. Then, in 334 Alexander invaded Asia, a plan 
he inherited from his father.
75
 The invasion was a pan-Hellenic expedition and a war of 
reprisal against the Achaemenid Empire for the Persian invasion of Greece and sack of 
Athens during the Persian Wars (490-479). This theme of revenge often shaped 
Alexander and his army’s treatment of cities.76 Alexander would, as we shall see, go 
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beyond the conquest of the heart of Persia, but if he ever anticipated so doing at the outset 
of his campaign, he did not make it public.
77
  
 
Pitched Battle 
 
The Macedonians fought three major pitched battles in Persia: Granicus (334), 
Issus (333), and Gaugamela (331), all of which involved the face-to-face clash of armies 
which were organized opposite one another in linear formation. As discussed above, the 
brutality of combat aided in a direct and unquestionable victory, an element with which 
Alexander was especially concerned.
78
 At the Granicus River, Alexander combated a 
coalition of Persian satraps under the command of the satrap Arsites.
79
  In the interest of 
matching the Persian troops and utilizing a traditional battle order, Alexander went to 
great trouble to maintain an unbroken front line while crossing the steep banks of the 
eponymous river. He defeated Arsites’ men with an innovative technique and the aid of 
the Macedonian general Amyntas, who forced an opening in the Persian order and thus 
tore through the belly of the Persian line and opened it for hand-to-hand fighting.
80
 
Although the othismos was not the central goal of battle, the traditional Greek preference 
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for close-range combat was still observed.
81
 The truly intimate nature of the fighting is 
perhaps best exemplified by the death blow the Persian noble Spithridates nearly dealt 
Alexander, halted only by the sword of the Macedonian hetairos Cleitus. Once the armies 
were entangled after the initial clash, even the king’s person was at serious risk.82    
 Alexander met the Persians in battle again in summer 333 at Issus (Iskenderun), 
where his army was greatly outnumbered. The Macedonians numbered 40,000 troops, 
and a plausible estimate of Persian forces is 100,000-150,000 men, who were led by the 
Great King Darius III himself.
83
 The Macedonians won the battle thanks to Alexander’s 
use of psychological warfare, which became a hallmark of his generalship. Because he 
knew how the enemy operated, Alexander suspected penetrating the Persian lines and 
killing or capturing Darius would demoralize the Persian army and cause it break 
formation in retreat, making it easier for the smaller Macedonian to cut down. The 
precision of the Macedonian cavalry, which Alexander led successfully through the 
Persian ranks, made this possible. When the Macedonians clashed with the Royal 
Bodyguard, Darius was forced to flee, which led to the collapse of the Persian 
offensive.
84
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The Macedonians did not combat the Great King again for almost two years, 
during which time they prosecuted more sieges (pp. 32-3) and took control of Egypt.
 85
 
Then in 331 the Macedonians met Darius again at Gaugamela (near Tell Gomel, Iraq).  
Gaugamela was the sort of high-stakes battle which the Great King needed to maintain 
his rule or the Macedonians needed to end the Achaemenid dynasty. Like Agesilaus at 
Mantinea (p.8), Alexander was desirous of combating the sum of Darius’ forces; he 
wanted to win the empire, rather than just the battlefield. Gaugamela was substantially 
different from Granicus and Issus in both participants and size. Darius’ easternmost 
subjects and allies were present: fighters came from as far as Bactria, Sogdiana, Asian 
Scythia, and India, and the lattermost came with elephants (Arr. 3.8.3-6). This was the 
first time a western army encountered elephants in battle, and considering additionally 
the sheer size of the forces participating, Gaugamela was the most monumental and 
perhaps the “least Greek” of Alexander’s battles before Bactria. The total of Persian 
forces involved in the battle varies widely in the sources, ranging from 200,000 infantry 
and 45,000 cavalry (Curt. 4.12.13) and, less reasonably, to 1,000,000 infantry and nearly 
40,000 cavalry (Arr. 3.8.6). Alexander’s forces are more reliably listed at 40,000 infantry 
and 7,000 cavalry, and even if an extremely conservative estimate of Persian troops is 
accepted, Alexander’s army was still impressively outnumbered at a ratio of at least 2:1.86 
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Because of this great difference in size, Alexander’s goal was to break up the 
Persian army by leading his cavalry directly against the Great King, just as he did at 
Issus. Descriptions of the battle among the ancient sources are widely divergent, likely 
because the dust kicked up by the cavalry on the plains impeded visibility and so 
produced varying eye-witness accounts.
87
 A general narrative can be patched together 
that Alexander was able to draw the general Bessus and his Bactrian forces far to the left 
of the Persian line, thinning it, and then pierce Persian defenses. Darius escaped while his 
men continued to press hard against Alexander’s left, held by the skilled general 
Parmenion.
88
 At the end of the day, Darius escaped to Media, but he had few resources 
left to him because the Macedonians had defeated the Persian army and its allies in battle. 
This time the Macedonians had won not the field, but the kingdom, and no seizure of 
symbolic prizes or statues were necessary: as Arrian notes, “Babylon and Susa were 
clearly the prizes of war” (3.16.2).  
As noted in chapter one, battlefield trophies were a frequently-used advertisement 
of victory in traditional Greek warfare, but Alexander’s record of battlefield trophies is 
rather spotty. This is likely because he was waging a large-scale campaign that required 
swift movement and involved a final goal and prize much greater than the field of battle. 
However, after the army’s first battle at Granicus, Alexander did honor the fallen by 
commissioning the court sculptor Lysippus to craft bronze statues of the first twenty-five 
hetairoi who died in the initial charge; the statues were set up at Dium in Macedonia.
89
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Further, Alexander sent a trophy of three hundred Persian panoplies to Athens for 
dedication in the Parthenon; these suits of armor were a reminder of the purpose of the 
campaign: one of revenge against the Persians, who had sacked and destroyed the 
Parthenon in 480.
90
 After Issus, no trophies or statues were erected, but Darius’ battle 
chariot was seized and sacrificial games were held in celebration.
91
 Although statues on 
the battle site itself, like Philip’s lion of Chaeronea,92 were not set up during Alexander’s 
Asian campaign, the very public acquisition and display of prizes did emphasize that 
Alexander’s was a Greek war against a barbarian enemy.  
 
Siege Warfare 
 
In addition to pitched battles, Alexander and his men prosecuted four major sieges 
in Persia. The first was Miletus (334), the capital of Caria (the west coast of Turkey).
93
 
Alexander needed to control all major coastal fortresses at which the Persian armada 
might anchor, and the superior Macedonian siege weapons, like towers and battering 
rams, allowed quick victory. Because the siege had cost little time or effort, only the 
Persian defenders who resisted and fought were taken captive, if they had not been killed 
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in the fighting. According to Diodorus, the Milesian civilians came before Alexander 
bearing branches as suppliants, and Alexander treated them kindly (17.22.4-5).  
The siege of Halicarnassus in Caria during the same year cost the Macedonians 
more time and effort.
 94
 Defeating Halicarnassus involved the great physical labor of 
filling trenches (Diod. 17.24.4; Arr.1.20.8-9), combating sorties,
95
 and putting out the 
fires set to Macedonian siege engines.
96
 Ultimately the Persian commanders of the city 
fled to Cos (Diod. 17.27.5), setting the city on fire behind them. Alexander did not 
capture the inner citadel, but established a Macedonian garrison to guard it and burned 
the remaining walls of the city. The civilians who had remained inside their homes in the 
city were spared.
97
  
After Issus, Alexander and his army moved against Tyre (333-332), an allegedly 
impregnable citadel situated on a small island off the Syrian Coast. The siege was unique 
because it lasted seven months and cost the Macedonians great labor and heavy 
casualties.
98
 The Tyrians defended the fort by heating sand and iron fragments over 
concave shields and pouring them from the walls onto the armored enemy. The defenders 
also pelted molten rock onto the flesh of the Macedonian soldiers and removed their 
shields or weapons with nets and ropes. If a Macedonian refused to be disarmed, he was 
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hauled up the side of the wall and dropped down in full view of the army (Diod.17.43.8-
17.44.5; Curt. 4.3.25-6). This vicious and personal nature of combat resulted in a more 
disastrous end for the Tyrians, whose civilian population was enslaved. In addition, 
Alexander ordered 2,000 of its military-age men crucified, likely in both revenge for his 
own men and in warning for any other fortress contemplating standing a siege.  
In the same year Alexander and his army took on Gaza near Egypt, whose satrap 
Batis must not have been intimidated by the consequences of Tyre.
99
 The army had to 
construct a mound and ramp with soil that consisted primarily of sand, and this took 
almost two months. During this time, Alexander was wounded twice, once in the 
shoulder (Arr.2.27-2) and once in the leg (Curt. 4.6.23), and the troops were at constant 
labor. The siege of Gaza followed the exhausting efforts at Tyre, and the army suffered 
from a shortage of water,
 100
 with the result that mounting frustration led to the infliction 
of andrapodismos when the city was taken. Curtius adds the story that Alexander, in 
imitation of Achilles, hooked the satrap Batis to the back of his chariot and dragged him 
around the city until he died (4.6.25-9). If it occurred, this highly personal act of 
vengeance was undoubtedly meant to warn any other citadels against resisting, and 
indeed the fort of Pelusium which led into Egypt offered no opposition.
101
 
 Alexander and his army’s early siege warfare did not differ radically from the 
Greek norm. The most violent response to a recalcitrant city was the use of 
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andrapodismos, which Alexander employed against the later two cities. Kern suggests 
the harsher treatment of Tyre and Gaza is tied to “the length of the siege, 
provocations…and the wounding of Alexander.”102 Additionally, it seems reasonable that 
the exceptionally brutal punishment of the Tyrians was due to the defenders’ very 
personal methods of attack. Even Alexander’s use of crucifixion, a mostly eastern form 
of punishment, had precedent among the Classical Greeks. Herodotus tells us that 
Xanthippus of Athens, the father of the famous statesman Pericles, besieged the Persian 
satrap Artayctes at Sestos after Artayctes robbed the heroon of Protesilaus on the 
Chersonese. When the citadel fell, Xanthippus crucified Artayctes and forced him to 
watch his son being stoned to death at the same time (Hdt. 9.116-22). As discussed in 
chapter one, the Greeks had their own particular brand of brutality in war, and cruel 
treatment of a city after a long or difficult siege was not unheard-of.  However, in Persia, 
Alexander never had to turn back to reconquer a city, and his progress along the coast 
was one of consecutive victories, contributing to a sense of progress. In Bactria and 
Sogdiana this would change, and Alexander and his army’s responses to resistance would 
become more violent.  
 
The Death of Darius III 
 
 After Gaugamela in 331, Alexander chased Darius over the Zagros Mountains, 
which led to a battle at the Persian Gates after a month-long stand-off. The satrap 
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Ariobarzanes guarded the pass to Persepolis, and his command of the heights prevented 
the Macedonians from advancing. Ultimately a shepherd with knowledge of a mountain 
pass allowed Alexander’s troops to catch the Persians from either side of the gorge and 
decimate Ariobarzanes’ army.103  
 From the Persian Gates, Alexander’s army moved to Persepolis and seized it as 
the war prize of a successful campaign.
104
 In imitation of Xerxes’ treatment of Athens 
during the Persian Wars, the Macedonians sacked “the most hated city in Asia.”105 At 
some point during the Macedonian occupation, Alexander burned the palace “to proclaim 
the end of Achaemenid rule.”106 However, Darius had yet to be apprehended, so in 330 
Alexander led 20,000 troops after Darius, tracking him to the Caspian Gates, Choarene 
(Khar), and then across the Dasht-i-Kavir salt desert. The Macedonians who arrived at 
the Parthian capital of Hecatompylus (Shahr-i-Qumis) found Darius already dead, 
assassinated with the knowledge of his satrap Bessus, who was in league with other 
Persian noblemen.
107
 The Great King’s death left Alexander as “King of Asia,” but his 
campaign was not complete. Bessus still needed to be apprehended because he had 
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declared himself Artaxerxes V. Related to Darius’ line by blood, 108 Bessus had already 
won the loyalty and aid of Persian nobles at Bactra as well as a promised troop of 
Scythian riders (Arr. 3.25.1-3), and his actions made Alexander’s pursuit of him 
imperative and justified the army’s march into Bactria. By donning the kitaris, the 
upright tiara worn only by the Persian king, Bessus made his intentions clear, as this 
emblem “offered the clearest manifestation possible of one’s claim to the throne.”109 
 In its pursuit of Bessus and entry into the wilds of Bactria and Sogdiana, the 
Macedonian army would be faced with a wholly foreign enemy. Unlike the Persians and 
their West Asian allies, the Bactrians and Sogdians would compel the Macedonians to 
endure, adapt, and innovate in the face of a form of combat that relied heavily on 
ambush, siege, and disdained pitched battle. It was in Bactria and Sogdiana that the 
Macedonian army began to respond to its enemies with greater savagery, antagonized by 
an opponent which operated according to an entirely different system of warfare and by a 
seemingly endless campaign. By the time Alexander led his army into India, the degree 
and incidence of violence escalated considerably, and the use of andrapodismos and even 
entire slaughter became more frequent.  
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Chapter 3: Bactria and Sogdiana 
 
 
 
I. The Macedonian Perception of Barbarians 
II. Treachery and Unpredictability  
   a. Satibarzanes 
   b. Bessus’ Betrayers 
   c. The Memaceni 
   d. The Scythian Tribes 
III. Causes for Revolt 
IV. Guerilla Warfare in Sogdiana 
   a. Ambush along the Jaxartes 
   b. Seven Sogdian Cities 
   c. Saca Circling Tactic 
   d. Ambush at the Polytimetus River 
   e. The Destruction of the Zeravshar Valley  
   f. Revolt Again in Bactria 
   g. The Rocks of Sogdiana 
V. The Effects of Climate 
VI. Alexander Looks to India 
 
 
Darius’ death meant that the goal of the League of Corinth had been 
accomplished. However, his kinsman and self-proclaimed Great King Bessus had not yet 
been apprehended, which meant that the empire the Macedonians had fought to win 
remained unsecured. Because their role in the campaign had been completed, Alexander 
disbanded his league troops with a hefty bonus, but he hired any who wished to continue 
in service as mercenaries.
110
 If Curtius’ account is to be believed, the Macedonian 
response to this order is telling. Hearing that the Greek troops were to be sent home, the 
Macedonians assumed they would march back as well: men “ran as though crazed to their 
tents and made ready their packs for the journey; you would believe that the signal to 
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march had been given throughout the whole camp” (Curt. 6.2.15-16). By the time the 
Macedonians reached Hecatompylus (330), they had been away from their homeland for 
four years, and it is not difficult to imagine that they were ready to return home. 
However, it was not to be.   
  Bactria saw the beginning of a violent change in Alexander’s men. The full 
manifestation of this shift, ferocious violence, physical and psychological degeneration, 
and finally insubordination, only became clear in India.
111
 By necessity, the Greek “rules 
of war,” as they were, began to change with the army’s surroundings; the practices to 
which the troops had been trained were associated with the “civilized” homeland and 
proved increasingly inapplicable to the wilds of Bactria and Sogdiana.
112
 The surges of 
violence perpetrated against the Macedonians in this land would be dealt back in spades 
to the natives of India, but the sort of psychological unwinding that prompted it occurred 
over a period of two years during which Alexander and his men were generally the 
victims. Holt notes that the Macedonians were “men of another world,” who expected to 
return to it.
113
 The army’s incompatibility with the land east of the Hindu Kush became 
increasingly apparent under the sporadic and resurgent bursts of revolt that plagued the 
territory. Alexander and his men were faced with frequent episodes of treachery and 
fierce local resistance which blunted their ability to trust and show leniency to the enemy. 
In Sogdiana, the army was confronted frequently by guerilla methods of war that were 
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foreign to it. Native revolts resulted in a rise in the rate and necessity of siege warfare, 
and the treacherous climate and terrain proved disadvantageous to pitched battle. With 
Bactria and especially Sogdiana as a backdrop, the famous carnage of the Indian 
campaign can be better explained.  
 The first sign of the army’s exhaustion came as early as 330 at Hecatompylus, but 
the conditions of war and varying understandings of the expedition’s purpose continued 
to drive a wedge between king and soliders as the campaigning progressed.
114
 A war of 
reprisal was becoming a war to secure the borders of a new empire, and it was necessary 
for Alexander to seize what he did not yet firmly hold in order to avoid losing what he 
and his army had won (Curt. 6.3.10). The army’s desire to return home at Hecatompylus 
was not a mutiny, but simply its impatience to return and belief that the king was 
“content with what he had accomplished” (Curt. 6.2.15) was to be expected after a long 
campaign.
115
  Although the army “regarded Darius’ death as the end of the campaign” 
(Diod. 17.74.3; cf. Justin 12.3) it sought neither to overthrow its king nor to drag its 
heels. Alexander was able to convince the Macedonians to press onward, citing the need 
to seize Bessus and those loyal to him lest they raise an army and undo what the 
Macedonians had achieved when they returned home.  
The exact speech Alexander gave to the army is unknown, but it must have been 
convincing.
116
 If Curtius is correct, the king heightened the mobility of his army by 
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persuading his men to burn their cumbersome wealth, first setting his own baggage carts 
on fire (Curt. 6.6.14-17). Curtius claims that no one mourned the loss because each saw 
his king doing the same, but it is difficult to believe the spectacle was not disheartening. 
The combustion of battle prizes and the fruit of hard labor in order to facilitate mobility 
signaled a long journey ahead.
 117
 There is nothing in the other sources to suggest that 
Curtius’ detail is a fiction, but neither is it corroborated. The sources’ commonalities do 
however cover the gist of Alexander’s speech and the army’s reason for pressing onward, 
which might have validated the haste Curtius indicates:
118
 Darius’ betrayer had resources 
and support, and it would “not be hard labor for Bessus to seize a vacant kingdom” (Curt. 
6.3.13). Further, Alexander received word that Bessus had also won the loyalty and aid of 
Persian nobles at Bactra as well as a promised troop of Scythian riders (Arr. 3.25.1-3). 
Bessus’ action made Alexander’s pursuit of him imperative and justified the army’s 
march into Bactria. 
 
I. The Macedonian Perception of Barbarians 
 
 
The Macedonians’ perception of the peoples beyond Persia and Media played a 
role in its desire not to march further into Asia; their understanding of the lands and 
peoples of the Far East, especially the Scythians, this merits a brief discussion here. 
                                                 
117
  Booty was usually sold locally in Classical warfare or passed off to the laphyropoloi to be managed. 
Perhaps Curtius was describing personal items that might have been used daily by the men (cum…spoliis 
apparatuque luxuriate) (Curt. 6.6.14), which in any case they must have been sorry to lose (N. Sekunda, 
“War and Society in Greece,” Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013], 210).  
118
 Diod. 17.74.3.; Plut. Alex. 47; Curt 6.3.1-18; Justin 12.3.2-3. 
  
41 
 
Presumably the soldiers of Alexander’s army would have known of Eastern cultures from 
Herodotus, Ctesias, and Xenophon, a blend of myth and fact about the other side of the 
known world. Herodotus, for example, says little about the Bactrians beyond listing them 
among various army forces, but their association with barbarity slips into his stories 
between the lines. Even the Persian commanders under Darius I thought the Bactrians 
frightful; the Persians warned the Milesians who were in revolt that failure to surrender 
would result in their being sold as slaves, the young boys made into eunuchs and the 
young girls “carried off to Bactria,” a fate seemingly equivalent to castration (Hdt. 6.9). 
The nomadic lifestyle of the Bactrians and Sogdians was a further sign of barbarity, 
perhaps evoking memories of similar tribal organizations in Thrace or Illyria along the 
western borders of the empire.
119
 As Holt notes at least a few of these apprehensions must 
have been dispelled upon entry into Bactria and Sogdiana, when Alexander’s army was 
presented with a view of fortified and organized cities, the use of advanced irrigation, 
temples, well-trodden trade routes, and at least a small caste of artisans and craftsmen.
120
  
There were certainly nomads dwelling in Bactria and Sogdiana, many of them 
Scythian tribes like the Sacae, Dahae, and Massagetae, who are distinct from the 
Scythians tribes of Europe. The Scythians of Asia were a formidable enemy not only 
because of their famed archers, but also because of the legends that surrounded their 
ferocity in and after battle, a sure match for Alexander’s own use of psychological 
warfare. According to Herodotus, the Scythians not only enjoyed making drinking cups 
of their enemies’ skulls, but also tied scalps to the bridles of their horses or used an entire 
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human skin for a cloak or quiver cover (Hdt. 4.64-5). If an enemy of the Scythians had 
the misfortune of falling in battle, a proper burial seemed unlikely, but perhaps more 
terrifying was the fortune of prisoners of war, who were supposedly sacrificed to the 
Scythian war god, dismembered, and left to rot after the sacrifice.
121
 A barbarous enemy 
associated with grisly post-battle practices that were anathema to the Greek tradition 
would prove unnerving,
122
 and a combination of loathing and fear might easily have 
intensified violence against the Scythians.  
Battle in Bactria and Sogdiana was significantly different for the Macedonians; it 
was characterized by quick strikes and ambushes, and the Macedonian army’s Scythian 
enemies were exceedingly mobile, often escaping capture, as we shall see. Since the 
people, customs, and terrain were entirely foreign, and the Macedonian army was far 
removed from any real bastion of western culture and support, Alexander’s men had no 
place to which they might retreat for safe-haven. At varying times both Bactra (Balkh) 
and Maracanda (Samarkand), the fortified capitals of Bactria and Sogdiana, respectively, 
were occupied by the Macedonians and then besieged by the enemy,
123
 and the sense of 
isolation and total self-reliance the army must have felt would have put a strain on men’s 
nerves over a long duration. While fighting in Thrace and Illyria, the Macedonian army 
was able to return home, but each region the army passed through during the conquest of 
Asia had to be secured before further progress was attempted to ensure a passage 
homeward was available. 
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 Bactria and Sogdiana were recalcitrant, and securing one territory did not 
guarantee its passivity; Alexander’s troops marched back and forth throughout the land, 
safeguarding their rear or preparing a way forward, and they became a city unto 
themselves. Their campaign is comparable to Xenophon’s Ten Thousand, a Greek army 
which fought in Asia (401-399). Leon of Thurii, one of the Ten Thousand, once 
expressed a sentiment that the soldiers of Alexander’s army must have begun to feel as 
well: “Well, I, for my part, comrades, am tired of packing up and walking and running 
and carrying my arms and being in line and standing guard and fighting. What I long for 
now is to be rid of these toils.”124 Endless campaign life was becoming a burden, and a 
significant facet of that burden was the difference between Western and Eastern warfare.  
Louis Rawlings points out that “Herodotus was right to say that there was a qualitative 
difference in the expectations of Greeks and the armies of the Persians.”125 This 
difference was only amplified for Alexander’s army as it moved further east into Bactria. 
The traditions of Eastern warfare relied on archery and sieges and a highly mobile 
cavalry, but in the West, “most hoplites probably shared a very different conception of 
battle” expecting to fight face to face and meet in an organized othismos.126 Alexander’s 
army was not a hoplite one, but it was still predominantly Greek in its behavior and 
depended on a direct clash of armies during the campaigns in Persia. Alexander and the 
Macedonians would find in Bactria and Sogdiana that attacks against them were more 
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similar to raids than pitched battle, and Macedonian victories over the enemy were not 
permanent or decisive. 
 
II. Treachery and Unpredictability  
 
a. Satibarzanes 
 
 
While treachery was not foreign to Greek war, the army’s encounter with it in 
Bactria and Sogdiana caused Alexander and his men to take preventative and punitive 
measures against possible sedition later in India. At first the transition from Achaemenid 
to Argead rule in Persia seemed a smooth one; as the army crossed the Tapourian 
Mountains, it received the peaceful surrender of several Persian satraps, and the 
remainder of its campaign appeared to require tying up loose ends and securing borders, 
not waging an entirely new war.
127
 However, by the time it became clear that capturing 
Bessus would not be a quick task, the Macedonians were already well into hostile 
territory, and any opportunity for dissent had passed. En route to Bactra in 330, the king 
received word that Satibarzanes, the satrap of Areia from whom he had accepted 
surrender, had rebelled behind him. Satibarzanes had slaughtered the small garrison 
Alexander had left in place at the Areian capital of Artacoana as well as its commander, 
the hetairos Anaxippus. In addition, the satrap armed the Areians, convincing them to 
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throughout the capital. Alexander was forced to halt the army’s progression and turn 
about with a fraction of his forces to cover a seventy-five mile march in two days’ 
time.
128
 Bessus had more allies than it had seemed, and the violent nature of 
Satibarzanes’ treachery may well have guided the Macedonian perception of the peoples 
who dwelled beyond Persia. Satibarzanes’ rebellion was the first instance of a pattern that 
would characterize the following two years: rapid movement, frequent treachery, and 
rebellions that required more than the army’s presence and a garrison to prevent.  
Curtius details the strenuous campaign in Areia and Satibarzanes’ perfidy.129 
When Alexander bore down on him, Satibarzanes fled to Bactra, while 13,000 rebels took 
up a defensive position on a wooded plateau of a nearby mountain range. Because the 
plateau’s sloping side was forested, an organized advance was impossible, and Alexander 
and his men were obliged to smoke out the rebels and cut them down as they escaped. At 
the same time, the general Craterus besieged the Areian capital Artacoana, and the arrival 
of siege towers finally ended the revolt. The entire process cost the Macedonian army 
thirty days, but when the inhabitants of Artacoana surrendered as suppliants, Alexander 
pardoned them and returned to them their property. The king’s response to suppliant 
peoples and willingness to prevent a sack of the city (cf. Miletus p.31) indicated he 
believed the region under his control and the rebellion quelled. However, the territory 
proved difficult to settle; it rebelled again under Satibarzanes’ prompting. The insurgency 
only ceased after Alexander sent two hetairoi
130
 to manage the area, resulting in 
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Satibarzanes’ death.131 In isolation these two revolts of Areia might seem a minor 
setback, but they represented the beginning of a troublesome pattern characteristic of the 
recalcitrance and immutability of Bactria and Sogdiana. Alexander and his men would 
learn to be less trusting and, frustrated by treachery and revolt, less merciful than they 
were towards the rebels of the Areian citadel, whom they appear to have spared during 
the second revolt as well, with the exception of Satibarzanes (Diod. 17.83.4-6; Curt. 
7.7.40). 
b. Bessus’ Betrayers 
 
As the Macedonians chased Bessus farther into Bactria, they must have become 
increasingly chary of oaths of submission when even their enemies could not maintain 
loyalty among themselves. The army was in pursuit of a man who betrayed his king and 
kinsman Darius, and Bessus himself was in turn betrayed and turned over to Alexander 
by Spitamenes in 329, who was “most highly honored by Bessus among all his friends” 
(Curt. 7.5.19). Spitamenes was aided by two other Iranian noblemen, Dataphernes and 
Catanes, “in whom Bessus had the greatest confidence” (Curt 7.5.21); these men took 
Bessus to Alexander to win favor from him for their own sakes.
132
 This chain of treachery 
must have impacted the Macedonian perception of governors in this region. If they 
betrayed one another with such ease, how could stability ever be ensured by reinstating 
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such men to power? Perhaps few were surprised when Spitamenes and Dataphernes went 
on to deny their earlier capitulation, refusing along with other Bactrian nobles the 
conference at Bactra (Arr. 4.1.5) for reasons that are unknown.
133
 Spitamenes incited 
further rebellion throughout Bactria and Sogdiana, demonstrating that his “surrender was 
a mere expedient, to be revoked when the time was ripe,”134 and this unpredictability 
proved a powerful campaign strategy against the Macedonian invaders. Spitamenes 
quickly became the author of an “anti-Alexander insurgency”135 which resulted in the 
massacre of foraging Macedonian troops along the River Jaxartes (Syr Darya) (pp. 54-6), 
and the fierce resistance of the seven citadels along the Jaxartes to which the attackers 
fled for refuge (pp. 56-60) (Arr. 4.2.1). This sudden turn-around must have proved 
seriously disheartening to the troops, who might have imagined their campaign would 
wind down after the capture of Bessus. There is no record specifying that Spitamenes 
ever claimed to be king, but his highly combative response to the Macedonians’ entry 
into Sogdiana made their continued presence necessary, and it opened the gates to a flood 
of revolts managed through a string of violent sieges and deadly stands against Scythian 
cavalry (pp. 60-2).  
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c. The Memaceni 
 
Such treachery appears also in battle, as in the case of the Memaceni, a tribe 
which dwelled in Sogdiana near the Jaxartes River. The Memaceni’s city was one of 
seven which rebelled from Macedonian control in 328. This valida gens (Curt. 7.6.17) 
stood a siege against Alexander’s men, but upon receiving a promise of clemency in 
return for surrender, the Memaceni yielded and welcomed the Macedonian horsemen into 
their city. After entertaining the soldiers, the Memaceni slew them while they “were 
heavy with feasting and sleep” (Curt. 7.6.18). In response, Alexander, who was besieging 
the city of Cyropolis, quickly sent Perdiccas and Meleager to capture the city of the 
Memaceni; the king himself joined his generals thereafter, during which time he received 
a stone wound to his neck that temporarily blinded and muted him.
136
 One must note that 
the story of the Memaceni comes only from Curtius (7.6.17-23), but it fits neatly into 
Arrian’s account as the last of the seven Sogdian cities, of which only two (Gaza and 
Cyropolis) are named specifically.
137
 Arrian reports that Alexander subdued two cities 
neighboring Gaza
138
 and “sent the cavalry to the two nearby cities with orders to keep 
close watch on those within the walls, lest they…contrive to flee…It turned out as he had 
guessed, and the cavalry was dispatched in the nick of time.”139 Given that no source 
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names and describes each of the seven cities along the Jaxartes, it is plausible that a 
people called the Memaceni dwelled in one of them, and there is no compelling reason to 
disbelieve Curtius’ account. If the story is true, this false surrender and brutal betrayal 
better explains both the strong recalcitrance of the Sogdian citadels along the river and 
Alexander’s response to them.  
Such crafty deception was not looked upon with admiration by contemporaries of 
Alexander. Using alcohol and false hospitality as a ploy to defeat enemy troops was 
closely related to the Greek perception of the weak-willed and generally inferior 
barbarians.
140
 The cruel slaughter after the promise of surrender not only resulted in 
disaster for the Memaceni—their city was razed to the ground—but in a sharply restricted 
offer of mercy for future rebels. The nature of this sort of change is necessarily gradual, a 
realization built upon an amalgamation of examples of treachery, and in Sogdiana the 
Macedonians had no shortage of it.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
suggest that Aristoboulus’ account uses the same sources as Curtius’, as they both indicate a fight for the 
stronghold after Cyropolis. Arrian makes no mention of the betrayal, but “it is more difficult to dismiss 
Curtius” (Bosworth, Commentary 2, 20) because of his clear narrative and its applicability to Arrian’s 
account. Bosworth notes that it is also possible that Ptolemy conflated the two unnamed citadels to give the 
impression of seamless victories in the seven citadel region. 
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d. The Scythian Tribes 
 
Perhaps equally detrimental to Macedonians’ perception of barbarian ties of 
loyalty was the confusing combination of surrenders and attacks from various Scythian 
tribes.
141
 The Macedonians may have been familiar with the Massagetae from stories of 
Queen Tomyris in Herodotus (1.205-14), but the nuanced distinctions between other 
tribes may well have been lost to them. Arrian tells us that Alexander treated with the 
Saca king of the Scythians and accepted his surrender after a battle along the Jaxartes 
River (4.5.1). Alexander released the prisoners of battle without ransom (Curt. 7.9.18), 
and that particular tribe of the Sacae did not give the Macedonians further trouble. 
However, the Dahae Scythians, a branch further west but still part of the Sacae tribe, had 
no compunctions about siding with Spitamenes and slaughtering a Macedonian reserve 
force sent to Maracanda in battle along the Polytimetus River.
142
  
Although the Dahae and the Sacae were governed by different chieftains, their 
tribal relations and the fact that both were Scythian nomads would have made the task of 
pacifying or thrusting back all Scythian assaults seem daunting and hardly manageable. 
No sooner had the army defeated and accepted submission from one branch of the tribe 
than another took it by surprise. This pattern likely did nothing to enhance the Greco-
Macedonian view of the inhabitants of Sogdiana and those allied with Spitamenes, and it 
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may have made it easier to justify violence against them. Considering the experience of 
the Macedonian troops throughout the Sogdian campaign, how long could an offer of 
surrender be taken seriously? It is not difficult to see how in future campaigns Alexander 
came more readily to believe himself betrayed.
143
 
 
III. Causes for Revolt  
 
Throughout the Bactrian and Sogdian campaigns, the great majority of violence 
enacted by Alexander’s army was a response to attacks upon it or a local revolt.  Before 
discussing the nature of this violence, it is beneficial to consider potential causes for such 
recalcitrance and the reasons Bactria and Sogdiana especially refused to submit despite 
being a longtime satrapy of the Persian Empire.
144
 There are no Bactrian or Sogdian 
sources similar to the extant Greek ones which might explain the resettlement in terms of 
the locals’ perceptions. Frank Holt plausibly conjectures that Alexander’s foundation of 
Alexandria Eschate (Khujand in Tajikistan) along the Jaxartes set off a string of 
explosive rebellions throughout Sogdiana, pointing to the fact that the king faced no 
serious revolts while crossing through Bactria. Holt’s theory explains the vicious attacks 
leveled against Macedonian troops after autumn of 329 and the city’s foundation. 
However, his explanation does not account for Satibarzanes’ ability to stir the Areians 
                                                 
143
 See chapter 4, section III.  
144
 Unlike India, Bactria and Sogdiana sent substantial aid upon Darius’ call at Gaugamela: Arr. 3.8.3, 
3.11.3, 3.11.6, and the kinship ties between the king and the traditional satrap of Bactria discussed above 
would indicate the region most definitely fell under the Persian king’s sway.  
  
52 
 
into revolt
145
 or the assault on the foraging Macedonians in the spring of 329 (Curt. 7.6.1-
9; Arr. 3.30.10-11). 
Holt explains that Alexander’s desire to be recognized as the political authority 
posed no problem for the locals of Bactria and Sogdiana who were not affiliated with 
Bessus, and it was only when he sought to break precedent by founding a city and 
threatening permanent, large-scale military presence that revolt broke out. Under 
previous Persian rulers, there had never been any direct attempt to govern or settle 
nomadic populations, but a general reliance on local princes and dynasts to conduct 
business. Alexandria Eschate appeared a threat to the pre-existing system and the local 
sovereignty of princes and tribes, threatening to attach local populations to his 
Macedonian royal city.
146
 While it is possible that all of this information might have been 
gleaned by locals from the mere foundations of the city, the revolts were so abrupt that it 
is difficult to believe attacking Scythians and Sogdians would have known “the native 
population as a whole” was to be “exploited as an agricultural labor force for the Graeco-
Macedonian colonists who were given a kleros.”147 Holt cites in addition the excavation 
of Greek-style houses in Sogdiana that were inhabited by the “elitist” society which 
would have controlled the agricultural labor,
148
 but the revolts began long before any of 
this might have been constructed, and there was no precedent for it in Bactria. It seems 
more logical that the fortification riled Sogdians and Scythians because it threatened to 
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form a guarded boundary between their lands, damaging their economic “symbiotic 
relationship” and threatening the commercial standing of Cyropolis, which was otherwise 
the most powerful city in the region.
149
 
However, it seems unlikely that Alexander had any plans to “exterminate the 
remaining Sogdian nobles”150 and only gave up when he faced resistance. Rather, he 
pursued a fairly direct goal throughout Bactria and Sogdiana: defeating Bessus and then 
Spitamenes and incapacitating their allies and potential safe havens. Villages or citadels 
that supported either rebel were taken, but Alexander did not uproot the governing system 
of Sogdiana. Just as in western Asia where the satrapies were maintained, local rulers 
were often maintained in their power.
151
  It is also unlikely that the uprising against 
Alexander was “as political and religious as it was military.”152 The recalcitrance of the 
locals cannot be summed up on religious grounds through the explanation that Alexander 
slew Zoroastrian priests and destroyed their sacred texts.
153
 Firstly, the Avesta, the sacred 
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Zoroastrian text, was not written down until the fifth or sixth century of the Common 
Era,
154
 making it impossible for Alexander to destroy. Secondly, as Boyce explains, there 
is no mention of Alexander specifically seeking to kill Magi, or Zoroastrian priests. The 
sources freely mention his killing of the Brahman priests in India,
155
 but it is only in 
Zoroastrian tradition that Alexander becomes a Magi-killer (the same tradition wherein 
he burned the unwritten book), which is likely rooted in a shared memory of the 
destruction which the Macedonian army caused in resisting regions.
156
 Boyce theorizes 
that the Magi played similar roles in Bactria as the Brahmans in India, fomenting 
resistance and uprisings against the invasion, but there is no substantial evidence for this. 
Arguing that the sources indicate the “magi were singled out for death,” she points only 
to Alexander’s execution of a usurper in Media, Baryaxes. He was a Mede who donned 
the kitaris and was subsequently brought to Alexander for execution by the satrap of 
Media, Atropates (Arr. 4.18.3; Curt. 8.3.17), likely a Zoroastrian himself, along with 
“[Baryaxes’] associates in his revolution and rebellion,”157 which by nature must have 
included Magi. This hardly suggests singling out a particular religious group, but rather 
restoring political order and giving no special treatment to treasonous priests. Further, the 
entire incident took place years after his resettlement of Bactria. Alexander’s only direct 
contacts with Magi are at the tomb of Cyrus and the Opis Feast (Arr.6.29.7-11; 7.11.8), 
as Boyce notes, and neither suggests religious persecution.  
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Indeed, Holt’s most prominent hypothesis, that the rebellion was touched off by 
Alexander’s founding of Alexandria-Eschate, seems the most viable conclusion.158 This 
was not the religiously-motivated rebellion that the Macedonians would face in West 
India in 325,
159
 but one that was likely provoked by political and economic concerns. The 
Macedonian violence, the topic of this chapter, was mostly a reaction to assaults upon the 
army. The sometimes grisly character of this violence, which fell outside the bounds of 
classical warfare, was due to the nature of the attacks waged by Bactrians and Sogdians 
and the mounting distrust the Macedonians must have felt for the local populace. 
Alexander’s relatively smooth passage through Bactria in 329 can be attributed both to 
the fact that “there was no passion for the cause of Bessus”160 and the fact that Alexander 
had no need to accost local settlements, who neither resisted him nor offered any threat. 
But when his army was attacked, retaliation was necessary, and if the assault proved 
somehow underhanded or non-traditional, the army responded in kind, producing an 
excess of slaughter.   
 
IV. Guerilla Warfare in Sogdiana 
a. Ambush along the Jaxartes 
 
A series of guerilla attacks on the Macedonian army began when it reached 
Sogdiana, and from 329-327 there emerged a cause and effect relationship between 
attacks upon Alexander’s army and the degree of violence with which the army retaliated. 
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The first of many reactions against the Macedonian army in Sogdiana began in 329 at the 
Jaxartes River shortly before Alexander founded Alexandria-Eschate.
161
 While 
Macedonian troops were out foraging for food, a potentially intrusive and ecologically 
destructive action in the view of locals, 20,000-30,000 Sogdians descended on them from 
the mountains.
162
 Catching the Macedonians unawares and unarmed, the Sogdians cut 
them down or made prisoners of them, taking some back to a Sogdian mountain citadel, 
which Alexander quickly besieged. During the endeavor Alexander himself was wounded 
by an arrow which fractured his fibula, but he remained involved in the siege until the 
fort was taken and some of its inhabitants put to slaughter. Arrian reports that only 8,000 
of the 30,000 natives survived, many being killed or choosing to hurl themselves from the 
cliff side.
163
  
Arrian’s numbers may be exaggerated, but one cannot imagine there was not a 
massacre on a large scale in retaliation for the ambush against “a disorderly band” of 
Macedonians (Curt. 7.6.1), likely also poorly if at all armed. Curtius reports that “more 
[Macedonians] were captured than were killed” (Curt. 7.6.2), but still the death toll must 
have been high, based on the number of Sogdian attackers. The fate of being picked off 
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from a distance by arrows and slings during the ambush (Curt. 7.6.2-3) and again during 
the siege (Arr. 3.30.11) and the added factor of Alexander’s own arrow wound must have 
severely worsened the results for the tribesmen. The attack along the Jaxartes fell outside 
the Macedonians’ frame of reference for just war; local Sogdians assaulted foraging 
(unarmed) men and behaved in accordance with the Greco-Macedonian stereotyped 
perception of semi-nomadic and mountain peoples.
164
 
 
b. Seven Sogdian Cities 
 
Perhaps one of the best-known accounts of Macedonian violence against 
Sogdians, many of them civilians, occurs during the siege of seven cities along the 
Jaxartes River, among which only Gaza,
165
 Cyropolis, and the fort of the Memaceni are 
named in the sources. The carnage was not a random act, but a military response to fast-
spreading rebellion. The soldiers may have vented their anger through violence upon the 
besieged, but their presence there was justified. In the late summer of 329, the Sogdians 
slew the Macedonian garrisons occupying their territory along the Jaxartes and refortified 
their strongholds. They were aided by Bactrians and incited by Spitamenes so that the 
rebellion fanned out from the Jaxartes and spread more quickly than Alexander could 
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contain it.
166
 Reports of garrisons at Bactra, Aornus, and Maracanda suggest that almost 
every settlement had a garrison installed and hostility was widespread from the start.
167
 
Arrian supposes the attack was in retaliation to Alexander’s call for a meeting at Bactra 
of all local governors, which “seemingly portended nothing good for them” (4.1.5). 
Curtius adds that Spitamenes and his ally Catanes fanned the flames by spreading word 
that “all the Bactrian cavalry were being sent for by the king, in order that they might be 
slain” (7.6.15), which widened the revolt.  
In order to overcome constant rebellion, Alexander’s tactics needed to change. 
The army was unable to continue operating according to the standards it had used in the 
West. Seizing the capital of a region did not guarantee that an entire area would 
capitulate; instead, it was imperative for Alexander to be as ubiquitous in the field as 
Spitamenes and his bands of rebels, who appeared and vanished often more quickly than 
they could be fought. Alexander began a methodical repression of the rebellion by siege; 
he split his army, sending Craterus and his men to deal with the rebellion at Cyropolis 
while Alexander invested Gaza (Arr. 4.2.2-3). Although the army could not have yet 
known it, the nature of its battle practice shifted considerably at this point; from 329 up 
through the king’s death in 323, the Macedonians would engage in only one other major 
pitched battle, the Battle of the Hydaspes River, but countless sieges. Before separating 
from Craterus’ division, Alexander ordered his infantrymen to construct ladders, and 
“each company was instructed to make a certain number” (Arr. 4.2.1). It is likely that 
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these ladders, made on such a mass scale, were carried with the army thereafter, repaired 
or replaced as needed; ladders appear in accounts of sieges most frequently in India,
168
 
and Arrian’s inclusion of this detail is not happenstance. Instead it serves as an emphatic 
reminder that the ladder would come to prove as essential an accoutrement of war as the 
spear.
169
  
The first sieges in Sogdiana were vicious. At Gaza, “obeying Alexander’s 
instructions, [the Macedonians] killed all the men and made off with the women, 
children, and other plunder.” Arrian reports that the army did this again at the second 
city, which goes unnamed, and implies that the same fate befell a third city (Arr. 4.2.4). 
The Macedonians isolated forts in rebellion with their cavalry to prevent inhabitants from 
fleeing and aiding or passing information to other strongholds, cutting down any who 
made a sortie (Arr. 4.2.5-6). The suppression was effected with a controlled brutality, and 
it was ultimately “understandable behavior” because of the unprovoked assault on 
Macedonian soldiers.
170
 Alexander’s rebuttal was “in keeping with Macedonian and 
Greek practices from the earlier classical period onwards,”171 even if the methods of war 
were changing. His policy against the Sogdian cities is understandable, with his 
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retaliation serving simultaneously as punishment for the massacre of Macedonian 
garrisons and as policy to prevent future insurrections.
172
 The king needed to drive a 
wedge between the Sogdians and Spitamenes, and he could not afford to demonstrate the 
same magnanimity that had characterized his earlier policies of cultural toleration. 
Alexander was no longer fighting “a regular war against a regular enemy, but one 
conducted against scattered rebel bands” who operated by an entirely foreign set of 
rules.
173
  
The king neutralized the region by defeating all seven cities, joining Craterus at 
Cyropolis, the largest, in which 8,000 occupants were slain, and the seventh city, 
potentially of the Memaceni (pp. 47-9), was captured and guarded (Arr. 4.3.4-5). The 
casualties were high due to resistance and undoubtedly some degree of frustration or 
haste among the Macedonians, but this method of eradicating rebellion may have worked 
in some cases. Curtius shows how this policy had at least some effect at Xenippa 
(8.2.15), where Spitamenes’ cohorts were driven from the city by locals upon word that 
the king (actually Hephaestion) was en route. Alexander’s approach to rebellion was, as 
Briant notes,  inherently pragmatic and “fairly straightforward: those who surrender 
willingly escape with their lives, those who resist to the bitter end, or refuse to supply the 
army, run the risk of being put to the sword.”174  
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While sieges had the potential to be glorious, despite being somewhat secondary 
in importance to pitched battle, which allows the direct contact of two enemies and the 
potential for a proper death in battle, it is difficult to imagine any grandeur of those mud 
forts in Sogdiana compared to the six month siege of Tyre (Arr. 2.16.7-2.24.6).  As 
Chaniotis asserts, it is the technology of a siege that is most noted by ancient historians 
because the most innovative weapons usually carried the day. If men were mentioned, it 
was perhaps only to note the first to scale the walls or, in the case of Malli, a debate over 
who held his shield over the wounded Alexander, and it was not frequent.
 175
 The 
exhaustion of the troops thereafter is not difficult to imagine, but the need for besieging 
rebellious cities did not abate. No sooner had the Macedonians subdued the region along 
the Jaxartes than they received word that Spitamenes was at Maracanda, besieging the 
Macedonian garrison there. Alexander sent a force of roughly 2,300 men to fight off 
Spitamenes, and the king passed almost three weeks fortifying his own foundation 
against further rebellion in the region (Arr. 4.3.6-4.4.1). Alexander’s stay at Alexandria-
Eschate would have provided a rest for the majority of his troops from war, if not labor, 
and simultaneously discouraged any final conflagrations of revolt.  
 
c. Saca Circling Tactic 
 
However, a respite from attack did not come; within this time another revolt 
exploded from across the Jaxartes, this time not from the Sogdians, but the Sacae, a tribe 
of Scythians. This insurgency best fits Holt’s theory of native response to Alexandria-
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Eschate, and Curtius corroborates the idea, claiming that the Scythians believed the 
foundation would prove to be a “yoke upon their necks” (Curt. 7.7.1) and sought to 
undermine its completion. The Sacae taunted the Macedonians and then began to fire 
arrows at the army as it crossed the river. It is doubtful that Alexander attacked the Sacae 
for “brazenly insulting” him (Arr. 4.4.2); the Sacae’s continued presence en masse was 
suggestive enough of violence that leaving them to their own devices while marching 
back to Maracanda was out of the question for the Macedonians (Arr.4.4.1-2).  
The Scythians were nomadic and not inclined to retreat to a citadel, yet they 
proved to be another deadly hurdle that also necessitated tactical innovation. The 
Macedonians had trouble both with the terrain and the enemy formation. Crossing the 
river under a hailstorm of arrows required the use of siege machinery to ensure a safe 
landing, but the army was learning how to combat the Scythians’ projectile warfare more 
efficiently.
176
 The Scythian mode of war did not allow for an othismos; warriors on 
horseback encircled enemy soldiers and fired arrows at them. The Scythians created an 
artificial barrier of men, and Alexander turned their own trick against them by producing 
his own wall of soldiers. Fuller produces an excellent reconstruction of Alexander’s 
tactics,
177
 showing how the king sent a small number of troops across the river as bait. 
When the Scythians encircled and attacked the small contingent of Macedonians, 
Alexander used his light infantry to form a crescent wall and then sent his cavalry around 
the infantry, cutting off the flanks of the Scythians who were riding in circles about his 
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men. This prevented the circle of Scythians from expanding and broke the ring, and 
thereafter Alexander’s main cavalry force was able to thread through his light infantry 
and attack the circle of Scythians beyond, crushing them into a press. However, the 
Scythian line of retreat was still open because the Macedonians formed only a crescent on 
one side, and many of the Saca cavalry rode off. Arrian reports 1,000 dead and 150 
captured, but once again the terrain interfered in the Macedonians’ pursuit, which was 
stopped short by fetid water and an attack of the flux that incapacitated Alexander and, 
imaginably, many of his troops (Arr. 4.4.8-9). The Macedonian victory proved “decisive, 
if measured by its moral result—the defeat of [Scythian] tactics rather than of 
themselves,”178 and while it was not a total defeat of the Scythians it did present the army 
with a view of native battle. Even after Macedonian success, past experience made 
Alexander wary of the Saca king’s submission, and he accepted it only due to a pressing 
need to reach Maracanda (Arr. 4.5.1).  
Alexander’s army, although dragged back and forth across the rocky Sogdian 
landscape, was continually faced by new, fresh enemies where it least expected. The 
Macedonians could not match the ubiquity of Spitamenes and his cohorts, who sparked 
rebellion in every region through which they passed. Equally exasperating, like the 
Scythians at the Jaxartes (Arr. 4.4.7), Spitamenes had no compunctions about fleeing into 
the steppes when he risked being outnumbered or overpowered, relying on the element of 
surprise to gain the upper hand in the future.
 
He had the uncanny ability to attack 
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Alexander’s army every which way but head-on and persistently evaded capture.179 
Spitamenes demonstrated this elusiveness once again at Maracanda, slipping away from 
the siege after receiving word that Alexander’s relief force was fast approaching; he 
retired es ta abata of Sogdiana.
180
  
 
d. Ambush at the Polytimetus River  
 
By autumn of 329, the Sogdians’ and Scythians’ preferences for retreat and 
strategic ambush must have been known, but nevertheless the Lycian commander 
Pharnuces led the Macedonian relief force astray from Maracanda in order to capture 
Spitamenes. A repeat of Jaxartes River incident awaited him. Arrian emphasizes that the 
troops followed Pharnuces into Scythian territory “without taking account of what they 
were doing” (Arr.4.5.3). The battle and ambush that followed are excellent examples of 
both the incompatibility of eastern and western fighting styles and the genuine distress to 
morale the Bactrian and Sogdian wars caused among the troops. 
The instinct to pursue the enemy and prevent it from returning to catch the 
Macedonian army off guard again was logical, but the relief force was ill-equipped to 
handle Spitamenes’ Scythian archers. Unlike Alexander along the Jaxartes, these men did 
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not have siege engines with them, and their horses were not fresh.
181
 The Macedonians 
under Pharnuces fell into the same wheeling cavalry trap and found themselves being 
shot at from a rotating circle of horsemen, powerless to advance. Unable to combat this 
technique, there seemed to be no chance of a proper battle, but only the constant threat of 
being entrapped and slowly picked off. The Macedonians’ retreat to a glen along the 
Polytimetus River was foiled by a Scythian ambush. Curtius emphasizes the 
underhandedness of the plot: “Spitamenes…had secretly laid an ambuscade where he 
knew that Menedemus [one of the relief force’s commanders] would come. The road was 
covered with woods and adapted to conceal the ambush; there he hid the Dahae 
[Scythians]” (7.7.31-2). Although Curtius does slip into a romantic narrative concerning 
the fate of Menedemus, the hopeless panic illustrated in the account at 7.7.34-9 is 
probably accurate, and it was worsened in part by confusion and haste among the 
commanders. General Caranus attempted to lead his men across the river without orders 
so that they slid down the steep banks “in a panicked, disorderly throng.”182  
Ptolemy’s choice to focus on the ineptitude of the generals in his account is 
unfair,
183
 but it emphasizes a certain degree of disorder and genuine panic not often seen 
among Alexander’s men. These soldiers were not new to war,184 and the Scythians must 
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have been a sufficient threat in the field to provoke disunity among the commanders and 
finally a break from the phalanx formation. Perhaps the image of Scythians familiar to 
Macedonians and Greeks provided another potent ingredient of their sudden alarm, 
knowing what became of men taken alive in battle. Although no source reports scalp-
cluttered bridles, the Scythians demonstrated sufficient viciousness in battle. Riding up 
alongside the edge of the river, horsemen shot at and chased the Macedonians onto a 
small islet of the river for shelter. They were not beyond arrow range (Arr. 4.5.6-9), and 
the Macedonians were shot down on the islet from the shores. A few of Pharnuces’ relief 
force had been captured alive, but “all of those [on the islet] they killed” (Arr. 4.5.9). 
Curtius gives casualty numbers at 2,300 (7.7.39), which match up with the number Arrian 
records as having departed for Maracanda (4.3.7) and his mention of total slaughter. This 
massacre’s potential for devastating the army morale was combated by Alexander 
directly, who held the information secret while marching his army swiftly to the site 
(Curt. 7.7.39), covering more than 180 miles in three days.
185
  
 
e. The Destruction of the Zeravshar Valley  
 
At this point in the campaign, a strong cause and effect relationship of violence 
becomes clear. The assault on the seven cities along the Jaxartes was waged in response 
to widespread revolt, and the attack on Maracanda and total slaughter of a substantial 
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relief force at the Polytimetus River was met in turn by the wrathful destruction of the 
whole of the Zeravshar Valley for its support of Spitamenes.
186
 After burying the dead 
(Arr. 4.6.5), Alexander continued the policy established in the region of Cyropolis 
intended to divorce locals from the revolutionaries. The king and his army put the valley 
temporarily out of commission by plundering the countryside; Curtius claims Alexander 
ordered Craterus and his men to set the fields on fire, a great devastation for the season, 
and to inflict andrapodismos on the population (7.9.22). Arrian says that the Sogdians 
who fled to their citadels were killed, because they were reported to have joined in the 
attack on the Macedonians (4.6.3-5). Even if the locals had not offered anything but 
passive support to Spitamenes, it was imperative that he not be given any safe place to 
retreat to take up arms a second time. Even so, the violence against civilians was 
exceptional, fueled by a desire for retribution and the frustration of endless marching 
across a seemingly indomitable territory. The casualties must have been high,
187
 and the 
attack was perhaps at least in part preemptive, a warning to any who might aid or give 
refuge to Spitamenes. Despite its scale, the repression was not effective and ultimately 
only prompted further resistance.
188
  
Revolts began again in the spring of 328, which showed that even garrison duty 
was deadly. The army had wintered at Bactra (Arr. 4.7.1; Curt. 7.10.13-5), leaving 
Sogdiana occupied only by garrisons, which were promptly compromised by a string of 
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revolts. The people had once again taken to their citadels, refusing submission and 
flouting the laws of the appointed satrap. It was imperative to locate and destroy the 
source of rebellion, which appeared to be Spitamenes (Arr. 4.16.1-3). The example made 
of the Zeravshar Valley did not last beyond the winter months, and may in fact have 
fueled already-present resistance, which would only necessitate further fighting. 
Marching his army again the two hundred plus miles to Maracanda, Alexander split up 
his troops to comb the land thoroughly for Spitamenes and put down regional rebellion. 
No sooner had the Macedonians arrived in Sogdiana than Spitamenes was behind them 
again in Bactria, sparking rebellion there with the aid of yet another tribe of Scythians, 
the Massagetae.
189
 He attacked a Bactrian fortress and slaughtered the guards, taking only 
the garrison commander prisoner (Arr. 4.16.4-5). Spitamenes then raided the surrounding 
land and provoked the garrison in the capital at Bactra;
190
 when it sallied out from the 
walls, Spitamenes and the Massagetae and caught the Macedonian force in an ambush 
near a wooded copse and slaughtered it (Curt. 8.1.3-6; Arr. 4.16.6-7). Once again 
Spitamenes appeared and disappeared when and where he was least expected, sending 
branches of the Macedonian army scrambling after its most elusive enemy, confronted 
just as at the Polytimetus River only by the bodies Spitamenes left in his wake (Arr. 
4.6.5). Even when Craterus was able to cut off some of the Massagetae fleeing from 
Bactria and win a pitched battle, the surviving Scythians “had no difficulty reaching 
safety” in the desert, where they vanished and could not be pursued (Arr.4.17.1-2). This 
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combination of ambush and extreme mobility, and Spitamenes’ ability to rile local 
populations and occupy Macedonian forces in one region in order to permit his own raids 
elsewhere, proved deadly. For the army, there must have been a growing insecurity about 
not only marching through rebellious territory, but even managing garrison duty and or 
the transport of relief forces. The enemy could not be tracked, and the great mobility of 
Scythian horsemen meant, as Spitamenes had shown, that they might crop up anywhere 
at any time, a tactic formerly characteristic of Alexander’s own rapid marches.191  
 
f. Revolt Again in Bactria  
 
A significant shift in the behavior of the Macedonian troops occurred in response 
to Spitamenes’ darting about, always occupying the land from which the invaders had 
just departed. The slaughter of the Bactra garrison occurred in the summer of 328, and by 
autumn Spitamenes and 3,000 fresh Scythian allies reappeared in Sogdiana, but 
Alexander had positioned a strong force there under the general Coenus to lie in wait for 
the rebel. The king was adapting to eastern fighting, and planned to take Spitamenes by 
surprise.
192
 Because Coenus had received word of Spitamenes’ approach, he was able to 
meet him in pitched battle, the first time Spitamenes had ever been compelled to fight the 
Macedonians in this fashion, and Coenus defeated the rebels, cutting down almost a third 
of their cavalry (Arr. 4.17.3-6). The result was catastrophic for Spitamenes, whose 
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Sogdian and Bactrian allies abandoned him and surrendered immediately to Coenus, 
emphasizing once again to the Macedonians the need to corner and destroy them in order 
to defeat them. Spitamenes’ Massagetae troops remained loyal only long enough to flee 
with him into the desert, but upon receiving word that Alexander meant to pursue them, 
they revolted and decapitated Spitamenes, offering his head to the king,
193
 which likely 
did nothing to dispel the stigma of barbarism the western armies had attached to them. 
 Although the army must have felt as though it were chasing its own proverbial 
tail in pursuit of Spitamenes, Alexander’s attempt to stabilize Sogdiana might have been 
more devastating in the long run. He tasked Hephaistion to resettle recalcitrant Sogdian 
populations (Arr. 4.16.3), which likely meant moving nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples 
to cities where a Macedonian garrison could keep an eye on them and thus curb their 
capacity for revolt.
194
 This was not an attempt at changing the Sogdians’ way of life 
either for their greater good or in order to enforce the superiority of Greco-Macedonian 
culture, but as a means of better guarding the region and preventing revolt in the empire 
as Alexander pressed onwards to India. The only manner of ensuring a lasting victory 
was to contain populations, thus preventing further rebellion from cropping up in 
unexpected locales. However, these garrison-occupied cities may well have only 
intensified resistance in the long run, even though force did something to quell it for a 
time. Arrian mentions only Alexandria-Eschate and the cities Hephaistion was ordered to 
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συνοικίζειν (4.16.3), but Curtius suggests six other smaller foundations (sedes) were 
established along the Oxus (Amu Darya) near Margiana.
195
 This direct degree of 
interference in the satrapies is what Holt argues intensified the resistance against the 
Macedonians, but it must have to some degree intensified the resistance of the 
Macedonians as well.  
It seems reasonable that there were multiple settlements throughout Bactria and 
Sogdiana, small-scale and perhaps intentionally temporary, but they had to be occupied. 
Coenus, in his speech at the Hyphasis River in 326, complained that “Those [Greeks and 
Macedonians] who have been settled in the cities you founded do not remain there 
entirely of their own will” and “others, wounded from past fighting, are strewn across 
Asia.”196 Many had no wish to be there; the Greek mercenaries settled as garrisons in 
Bactria and Sogdiana rebelled immediately upon the false rumor of Alexander’s death in 
325 (Diod. 17.99.5; Curt. 9.7.1). The cost of suppressing revolt and controlling the 
eastern half of the empire proved enormous in terms of both time and manpower. 
Alexander could hardly have vacated the region and allowed Spitamenes free rein, thus 
losing a large portion of what was traditionally Achaemenid territory, but a constant 
bombardment of violence instigated by the supposedly conquered chipped away at the 
army’s resolve to march further into unknown lands. Deprived in part of their role as 
conquerors, the Macedonians were generally obligated to suppress rebellions and avenge 
attacks upon their comrades, and this was hardly the same thing as reaping the rich 
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rewards of a successful conquest as they had in the wealthy heartland of the Achaemenid 
Empire.
197
  
The nature of battle had certainly changed for Macedonians by 327, featuring a 
higher frequency of sieges and use of ladders, catapults, and siege towers, as well as 
ambush, and no pitched battles. Alexander’s strategies of occupation had changed too. 
The light garrisoning of capitals and forts, symbolic of regional conquest, was no longer 
sufficient. Constant attacks on Bactra and Maracanda made leniency in the future less 
likely; it was easier to decimate and occupy a region than to leave behind a handful of 
Persian or Macedonian governors and guards who could do nothing in the face of united 
revolt.
198
 The defection of smaller forts and towns, although less dangerous to their hold 
on the region, must have chipped away at Macedonian patience as well. Very few such 
villages are recorded specifically by the sources, likely because they did not pose 
significant enough threats, but accounts like those of the Memeceni fortress near the 
Jaxartes (Curt. 7.6.17-21) and the second revolt of Xenippa
199
 indicate a broader swath of 
small-scale rebellion than is directly stated. A new territory merited a new method of 
repression, but Alexander’s initial policy and willingness to hear surrender was still in 
effect (Diod. 104.4). Since the death of Darius, Alexander had reinstated those who 
surrendered peacefully: Nabarzanes, Phrataphernes,
200
 Autophradates (Arr. 3.23.7; Curt. 
6.4.24-5), and Satibarzanes (Arr. 3.25.1-2), until he rebelled. Soon other minor Sogdian 
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kings, Oxyartes, Chorienes (Arr. 4.21.6-9), and Sisimithres
201
 were also reestablished in 
his position. Taxiles, the Indian raj of Taxila, unsurprisingly caught onto this pattern and 
offered his own submission the moment it was asked of him.
202
  
 
g. The Rocks of Sogdiana 
 
Movement against the “Rocks” or rock citadels of Sogdiana in rebellion helps to 
characterize Alexander’s adjusted method of patrolling the satrapy.203 Rather than 
installing large garrisons where power was already centralized by a native ruler, 
Alexander won the leaders’ submission and secured it against later treachery either 
through marriage or enlisting kinsmen into his army. The subjugation of the rock citadels 
was more akin to the nature of war in the West and Asia Minor than what the 
Macedonians had thus far experienced in the Far East of Bactria and Sogdiana. The army 
was not fighting an entire population, but the fortified capital of a local region. Perhaps 
more importantly, the enemy was stationary and not able to flee into the desert; an 
opponent’s fortress and the headquarters of his army could be taken and easily patrolled 
because it already controlled the surrounding region. Alexander managed to seize the 
                                                 
201
 If Sisimithres is distinct from Chorienes, as Bosworth (Commentary 2, 125) supposes, his surrender and 
return to power occurs at Curt. 8.2.32-3. See also Holt, Alexander the Great and Bactria, 67. 
202
 Diod. 17.86.3-4; Curt. 8.12.5; Arr. 4.22.6.  
203
 Unfortunately there is some serious debate about the identity of the rocks that makes attaching particular 
people and incidents to specific locations very difficult. Arrian’s story and the Vulgate tradition both 
overlap in a confusing array, and the chronology, too, is hopelessly tangled. I emphasize above the overall 
results of capturing the Rocks, but for further assessment see Holt, Alexander the Great and Bactria, 66 
n.65. Holt notes that what Arrian calls the “Rock of Chorienes” (4.21.1-10) is the “Rock of Sisimithres” for 
Curtius (8.2.19-33) and Plutarch (58), and Strabo (11.11.4). However the story of Roxanne cannot be 
placed; Strabo puts her at the “Rock of Sisimithres,” Arrian at the “Sogdian Rock,” and the story of the 
“winged men” appears in Arrian’s “Sogdian Rock” story in the same fashion as it does in Curtius’ “Rock of 
Ariamazes” (Curt. 7.11.1-29). Additionally, Bosworth gives his own interpretation of the contradictory 
sources; see Bosworth, Commentary 2, 124-67. 
  
74 
 
local kings’ centers of operations in both cases. Using his “winged soldiers” to capture 
the Sogdian Rock in the spring of 327,
204
 the siege was completed with minimal lives 
lost,
205
 and the king maintained his policy of clemency in return for surrender.
206
 The 
disastrous rebellions of Sogdian cities in the past prompted a different method of securing 
an alliance, and Alexander married King Oxyartes’ daughter Roxane, taking a page from 
his father’s book to ensure the king’s continued loyalty.207 
A similar account occurred in 327 at the Rock of Chorienes in Pareitacene, the 
land between the Polytimetus and Oxus rivers East of Sogdiana;
208
 the army labored to 
fill in the steep ravine about the fortress, but it did not have to fight after having crossed 
it. King Chorienes surrendered, and after he provisioned the Macedonian army, his good 
faith was secured through the enlistment of his two sons in Alexander’s army (Curt. 
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8.2.33). Alexander’s use of personal ties to ensure loyalty was a more secure means than 
the word of surrender, which had proved fruitless in the past. This strategy was possible 
only because power in the region of the rocks was sufficiently centralized, and 
submission from an established local ruler, rather than a foreign satrap, would better 
assure security in the future. Alexander had had no such opportunity against 
Spitamenes,
209
 who had central source of power or fortress to besiege. There mere act of 
cornering him for battle proved almost impossible.  
Spitamenes was arguably Alexander’s most vicious and dangerous enemy. The 
Bactrian’s ability to outpace the Macedonian army and his talent for raising rebellions in 
seemingly conquered regions prepared the troops for great resistance in the future. He 
was able to use even the terrain against his enemy, mounting a guerilla war waged by 
warriors who “entrenched themselves on inaccessible crags, and when pursued vanished 
into the Turkoman steppes.”210 Despite Alexander’s practical decision to lighten the 
equipment of his phalanxes, Spitamenes was still able to inflict greater devastation, 
numerically and morally, on the Macedonian army than any prior enemy at that point. 
The substantial reinforcements that the army required between the defeat of Darius at 
Gaugamela (331) and the end of the Bactrian and Sogdian campaign (327) is estimated at 
just over 47,000 infantry and cavalry combined.
211
 This highlights both the serious losses 
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in Bactria and Sogdiana as well as an anticipation of potentially similar struggles a few 
years later in India.  
It is not difficult to see how the Macedonians might had little patience when the 
peoples of India resisted their invasion, and Alexander and his army’s experience in 
Bactria and Sogdiana made them less likely to trust offers of surrender.  On the whole, 
Bactria and Sogdiana proved intractable lands, and the degree of their conquest is still 
hotly debated by scholars.
212
 The most immediate cause of this difficulty of conquest is 
militant rebellion. This was likely the first source of suffering and catalyst for violence in 
the minds of the Macedonian army as well, but a close second, which is easier for one 
reading or listening to an account to overlook, must have been the climate.  
 
V. The Effects of Climate 
 
Environment drastically affects one’s ability to function on a day to day basis, 
especially in a military context, and the wildly vacillating weather of Bactria and 
Sogdiana exposed Alexander’s army to the extremes of nature beyond what it had 
experienced in Macedonia.
213
 Holt emphasizes the foreign and forbidding nature of the 
land with good reason: Bactria and Sogdiana were near the ends of the earth for the 
Macedonians and Greeks. When Alexander and his army passed through the Hindu Kush, 
they identified it as the Caucasus, the legendary mountain range where Zeus chained the 
titan Prometheus, supposedly located at the edge of the world. However, they must have 
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realized the world stretched a little farther than they once thought, when they were unable 
to view the Encircling Ocean from the tops of the mountains.
214
 Although it was nothing 
to rival what would come in India, at the time the adverse climate, topography, military 
and social culture must have drastically and detrimentally affected the army.  
The Bactrians and Sogdians “inhabited some of the most difficult regions in the 
world for any type of army to operate in.”215 Everything in Bactria existed on a larger 
scale; it was studded by mountain ranges, the Hindu Kush and Amu Darya, and Sogdiana 
was a combination of open steppes and desert.
216
 The fluctuation between seasons was far 
more severe than that Macedonian weather, which featured characteristics of both 
Mediterranean and continental climates in the eastern and western halves of the territory, 
respectively.  The Macedonian introduction to the farther East came through the army’s 
crossing of the Hindu Kush, a mountain range with peaks between 14,000-17,000 feet, 
almost twice as high as Mt. Olympus, at 9,570 feet. Because of their height, the 
mountains maintain a cloak of snow year round, but the combination of rivers and deserts 
speckle Bactria with widely varying climes, from arid desserts to fertile and almost 
tropical valleys.
217
 Flatlands occasionally spotted with forests and fortified hills made 
perfect launching places for surprise attacks by the natives, and the Macedonian army’s 
complete unfamiliarity with the region hampered its ability to prepare adequately for 
what its enemies, or the weather, might send at it. The terrain and climate of Bactria 
facilitated guerilla warfare, and “the fighting was especially difficult because of withering 
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ambuscades and widespread revolts of a type often written upon the landscape.”218 
Additionally, the natives’ surroundings contributed to the perception of the Bactrians and 
Sogdians as the “other,” who not only behaved differently in combat, but occupied a land 
of wild extremes. 
 The army first encountered the severities of the climate at the onset of its 
eastward march. Alexander and his men crossed the Hindu Kush in the spring of 329 in 
pursuit of Bessus, who had initiated a scorched earth policy, laying waste the land ahead 
of the Macedonian army to discourage its advance. To avoid the worst of this, Alexander 
led his men through what is likely the Khawak Pass of the Hindu Kush, a more difficult 
(and therefore less expected) path than the Shibar Pass.
219
 Nevertheless, the army ran into 
snowdrifts and ice-covered mountainsides; it was poorly provisioned, and despite the 
spring season on the ground, at higher altitudes the wind-chill was devastating. Supplies 
were few, and of the most effective source of calories, grain, “very little or nothing was 
found” (Curt. 7.4.23). The army was ultimately reduced to slaughtering its own pack 
animals for food until it was able to descend and enter Bactria proper. It is doubtful that 
the conquering army felt much like one, reduced despite the wealth they had won to 
consuming the flesh of the animals that bore it. There may well have been a collective 
frisson of apprehension at the thought of an eventual return might involve a doubling 
back through the Khawak Pass.  
The effects of the climate were intensified by the army’s subsequent march 
through the Turkestan Desert (Curt. 7.4.27-9; 7.5.1-18). First plagued by freezing 
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temperatures, the men were then scalded by unforgiving terrain and a forty mile stretch of 
sand and heat. Curtius describes the army’s desert march: “For 400 stadia, not even a 
drop of water is to be found. The heat of the summer makes the sands hot, and when they 
began to glow, everything is burned as if by a continuous conflagration” (7.5.2-3). The 
army travelled by night in order to avoid the worst of the heat and to navigate by the 
position of the stars (Curt. 7.4.28-30), but shorter nights in summer lengthened the 
overall journey. As a result, when the army reached the Oxus River, Curtius reports that 
many drank from it in a frenzy and died, “and the number of these was much greater than 
the king had lost in any battle.”220 To make matters worse, Bessus had destroyed all the 
boats at the river crossing, providing yet another obstacle to overcome (Arr.3.28.9).  
 Holt asserts that the Macedonians’ “actual experiences in the area fully justified 
any uncomfortable premonitions,”221 and indeed there seems to have been some stirring 
of discontent among the Thessalian contingent directly after the desert crossing. Curtius 
accounts for the departure of 900 Macedonian troops “whose discharge was due” after 
the Oxus crossing (7.5.27). Arrian, who places the event before the crossing, reports that 
Alexander sent home the oldest of the Macedonians who were past fighting as well as the 
Thessalian volunteers who had travelled with him, citing no reason for the latter’s 
discharge ( 3.29.5). However, in his speech at the Hyphasis River (326), Coenus claims 
that Alexander sent the Thessalians back from Bactria because they were exhausted and 
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“no longer eager for our toils” (Arr. 5.27.5). The use of ἀπολέμους (“unfit for war”) to 
describe the Thessalians suggests war weariness, but it is difficult to determine whether 
this was Arrian’s own inference or a statement present in his sources concerning Coenus’ 
argument.
222
 In either case, it seems logical to assume that the discharge of the oldest 
soldiers was effected in expectation of greater physical hardship in Bactria (Arr. 3.29.5). 
Because he was in hot pursuit of Bessus, it was not an opportune time for Alexander to 
let go 900 men, and it cannot be coincidence that it occurred directly after a deadly desert 
crossing. 
 Treacherous terrain was made more difficult by rapidly shifting weather. A false 
spring of 327 led Alexander to lead his men from their winter quarters at Nautaca, but 
three days into the march to Gazaca, a torrential hailstorm opened up on the plains.
223
 
Alexander led his men from their winter quarters at Nautaca, and three days into their 
march to Gazaca a torrential hailstorm opened up on the plains. Curtius’ detailed account, 
rather than appearing artfully embellished, gives a rather detailed look at what the 
experience must have been like:  
“At first indeed they had received the hail successfully on the 
cover afforded by their shields, but finally their stiffened hands 
could no longer hold their slippery weapons, nor could they 
themselves determine in what direction to turn their bodies” (Curt. 
8.3.5-6).  
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Although Curtius emphasizes the ferocity of lightning and thunder (8.3.3-4), it is absurd 
that the Macedonians were frightened by it. Rather, it was the physical pain of the 
weather, accompanied by a sharp drop in temperature which usually trails a hailstorm, for 
which they were unprepared. After breaking rank to enter the forest, many of the 
Macedonians froze to death overnight and were found where they had knelt for shelter, 
“stuck to the trunks of trees, looking as if they were not only alive but even talking 
together” (Curt. 8.4.14). Although much of the army was able to return to camp, where 
fires were started, still Curtius reports that 2,000 died (Curt. 8.4.13). Even if this number 
is an exaggeration of the original, doubled or even tripled, that is still an astounding 
casualty figure for a battle with the climate.
224
  Weather does not often appear in 
discussions of warfare, but an army fighting against both an enemy and the weather is 
bound to wear out twice as quickly.  
 
VI. Alexander Looks to India 
 
 Alexander’s army was a hardy one, but Bactria and Sogdiana wore it down. After 
defeating its original target, Bessus, the army was obligated to pursue the equally 
dangerous Spitamenes, chasing him back and forth between Bactria and Sogdiana while 
suffering explosions of local revolt and deadly ambushes along the way. The terrain 
could rise into icy mountains or split into miles of desert, and the seasonal changes were 
occasionally irregular, with disastrous results. But there was no outcry; occasional 
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reticence did not translate immediately into mutiny. Instead, frustrated by an elusive 
enemy and a string of revolts which Plutarch compared to the many-headed Hydra,
225
 the 
army vented its frustrations through violence upon its foes. Often, this translated into 
brutal attacks upon territories in revolt and undoubtedly a great loss of civilian life. While 
Spitamenes was regularly able to retreat into the desert, disappearing far out of the 
army’s reach, his sedentary allies in local citadels suffered for him.  
The refusal of local nobles to attend a conference at Bactra (Arr. 4.1.5) in 
conjunction with rebellions around the capitals of the satrapies, Bactra and Maracanda, 
left Alexander with the option of forceful repression or ceding the region to those already 
in occupation of it. The entire campaign in these satrapies set a new standard of battle for 
the Macedonians. It was less familiar, fought against peoples known only through 
literature, against nomads who had “no cities or settled communities and hence do not 
fear for treasured possessions” (Arr. 4.17.5) and had no use of citadels. There was no 
capital to take that might secure a region, and successful battles against Spitamenes’ 
nomadic allies could not guarantee their passivity unless a large enough number was cut 
down to incapacitate them.
226
 War in these satrapies was more vicious. Raids and 
ambushes were often on a large scale and, due to the mobility of Spitamenes’ Scythian 
allies, in large part fatal for the Macedonians. While Alexander might return prisoners 
once captured (Curt. 7.9.18), the rebels in Sogdiana did not make this their practice, 
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likely because prisoners would hamper their retreat (Arr. 4.5.9). War was seemingly 
endless, and the quelling of a revolt was almost inevitably temporary. Alexander’s army 
marched hundreds of miles of ruts into the lands of Bactria and Sogdiana, turning back 
and forth in pursuit of elusive enemies who preferred leaping out from among the trees to  
meeting on a leveled plain or even prosecuting sieges. The land itself seemed unkind, 
ruled by a climate as sporadic and unpredictable as its inhabitants.  
Bactria and Sogdiana did not prove to be the endgame for the Macedonians, but 
merely a prelude to India, to which Alexander turned next. India was its own unique 
region, divided into principalities ruled by minor kings, stratified hierarchically according 
to a caste system, and operating under a venerated and ancient religion that far predated 
Zoroastrianism. India, like Bactria and Sogdiana, was also the Other. The soldiers 
following Alexander into India did not enter with a proverbial blank slate; they were 
weighted with personal experiences and exasperation brought in from the north. India 
would prove to be an even more wildly different and deadly enemy, contributing to the 
exhaustion and demoralization which had already begun. The traditional rules of hoplite 
warfare would be bent and stretched out of shape to accommodate a very non-traditional 
enemy, resulting in greater violence endured and inflicted, and finally a devastating 
collapse of morale.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
84 
 
Chapter 4: India
227
  
 
 
I. Macedonian Invasion and Autonomy in India 
II. The Nature of Fighting in India 
a. The Assaceni 
b. Massaga 
c. Sangala 
III. A Policy of No Resistance 
IV. The Killing of Brahmans and the March Home 
a. Philosophers and Politicians 
b. The Malli 
c. Musicanus and Sambus 
V. War Weariness and Violence 
a. Endless Sieges and the Unfair Fight 
b. The Importance of Pitched Battles 
c. A Disheartened Army 
d. The Psychology of War Weariness 
e. Alexander’s Wounds 
f. Cultural Isolation 
g. Rebellions of Settlers  
 
 
 In the summer of 327, Alexander entered West India (present day Pakistan) in 
what would be the last phase of the Macedonian campaign of expansion. The invasion 
and conquest of India would also prove to be the bloodiest of the army’s endeavors. The 
precipitous rise in violence stemmed from both Alexander’s policy of no resistance and 
his army’s increasing exhaustion and frustration with a toilsome and seemingly endless 
campaign. The invasion culminated in such brutality because of a combination of factors 
unique to the region including the Indians’ belief in their autonomy and Alexander’s 
execution of Brahmans, which might not have produced similar results elsewhere. The 
                                                 
227
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Macedonians were often unable to force a pitched battle, but as in Bactria and Sogdiana, 
they were obligated to prosecute a string of sieges. Such monotony in combination with 
the cultural and physical environment of the land took a heavy toll on the army. The 
disaffection of the troops led to a gradual decline in morale that was characterized by 
anxiety over leadership, Alexander’s increasingly risky behavior in battle, and a rise in 
war-weariness.   
 
I. Macedonian Invasion and Autonomy in India 
 
 
 
 Alexander invaded India with the goal of expansion.
228
 He wanted to gain control 
of what he believed fell under Darius III’s hegemony and insure that his own sovereignty 
be acknowledged.
229
 It is not impossible that Alexander would have wished to restore the 
empire to its former size under Darius I, which, as he would have known from Herodotus, 
extended “over the whole of Asia, with the exception of Arabia.”230  This goal does not 
differ significantly from Alexander’s policy and behavior elsewhere during his campaign, 
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 For a succinct discussion of the Indian campaign, see A.B. Bosworth, “The Indian Campaigns 327-325 
B.C.” in Brill’s Companion to Alexander the Great, ed. J. Roisman (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 159-68. 
229
 Arrian’s assumption that Alexander’s desire for expansion was fueled by his pothos, or “longing” might 
be true, but it can hardly account for leading an army on a two year campaign (327/6-325).  U. Wilcken 
(Alexander the Great [London: Norton & Co.], 1967) characterizes Alexander’s invasion as the product of 
pothos and the desire to expand his empire “to the limits fixed by nature to the inhabited world” (174). For 
a contrasting argument, see P. Spann (“Alexander at the Beas: Fox in a Lion’s Skin, The Eye Expanded: 
Life and the Arts in Greco-Roman Antiquity ed. F. Titchener and R. Moorton [Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1999], p.  62-74), who argues that Alexander recognized that world sovereignty was 
impractical and that the mutiny at Hyphasis was no more than “public relations bunkum” contrived by 
Alexander and his senior generals to mask his unwillingness to continue East (69). Heckel, Conquests of 
Alexander the Great, 121-3 follows this line of argument by contending that Alexander intended Nicaea 
and Bucephalia as outposts of his realm. See further: W. Heckel, “Alexander the Great and the Limits of 
the Civilized World,” Crossroads of History: The Age of Alexander, ed. L.A. Tritle (Claremont: Regina 
Books, 2003), 147-74.  
230
 Hdt. 3.88. Herodotus further details the divisions of satrapies under Darius I, with India being the 
twentieth and also paying the largest sum in 360 talents of gold dust (3.95).  
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but the political status of India (best conceived of as a conglomeration of local dynasts 
and tribes, rather than a single united region) as well as its traditions of battle meant the 
means by which Alexander applied his policy had to be changed, which resulted in a 
steep rise in violence. 
Alexander entered India desirous of submission, but anticipating some resistance. 
He would have been well aware that Darius’ influence had extended at least as far as the 
Kabul Valley, whose inhabitants had sent military support for Gaugamela.
231
 However, 
just how much of India truly belonged to Darius is uncertain. We know from Arrian that 
the Assaceni peoples, in Lower Swat, had been “paying a set tribute” since Cyrus son of 
Cambyses, and before that, they had been part of the Median and Assyrian Empires (Ind. 
1.3). Further, Arrian’s frequent use of the term hyparch to describe rulers of Western 
India, a word that characteristically denotes a satrap, is a clear indication that those 
regions still fell under Persia’s administrative jurisdiction.232  
Persia does not, however, appear to have enjoyed direct control of India for some 
time; the Indian forces sent to Gaugamela were not substantial,
233
 and one would expect a 
more extensive contribution from a fully consolidated territory. As Stoneman points out, 
those ruled by the men whom Arrian labels hyparchs may have fallen under technical 
Persian jurisdiction, but there is no record of Persian satraps as such, and the connection 
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 Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 74-85. I. Worthington, By the Spear, 187-93. Cf. n.6. 
232
 Bosworth, Alexander and the East, 155. 
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 Wilcken, Alexander, 173-4; I. Worthington, Alexander the Great: Man and God (Harlow: Pearson, 
2004), 196. Arrian notes that Indians from along the Bactrian border went to Darius’ aid (3.8.3), but the 
sum total of assistance from Indians west of the Indus consisted of “οὐ πολλοί … ἐλέφαντες,” that is about 
fifteen, and of course none from the territories of the Hydaspes or Acesines (3.8.6). Arrian hints at where 
the Indian troops were stationed at Gaugamela at 3.11.5; 3.13.1; 3.14.5; 3.15.1. It is important to note that 
Arrian uses “Indians” to describe a wide range of ethnicities and in this case, while referencing the 
“Indians” along the Bactrian border he is describing Arachosians. Cf. Romm, Landmark Arrian, 112; 
Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 119 n.297.    
  
87 
 
must have deteriorated over the years.
234
 This indicates a loose relationship between the 
King and his easternmost holdings, though exactly where the border was is still debated.
 
Heckel emphasizes how it is “wrong to speak of the Macedonian conquest of India”; 
although certain groups were certainly conquered, Alexander “had not, in fact, advanced 
beyond the boundaries of the Persian Empire,” but merely attempted to restore its original 
authority.
235
 This assertion conflicts with Arrian, who notes that the land beyond the 
Indus, and especially beyond the Acesines (Chenab), did not belong to Persia; Arrian 
explains that the people living much further East beyond the Acesines were Indians “who 
had from ancient times been autonomous” even if these in particular came over to 
Alexander willingly (5.24.8). Arrian’s statements suggest that the Great King’s power 
had not encompassed territory as far as the Hyphasis (Beas), and Alexander did indeed 
plan to expand, not only to consolidate. 
The autonomy Arrian mentions and the severe resistance the Macedonians faced 
indicate that most Indian peoples did not see themselves as part of the Persian Empire. 
Forcing their compliance spurred a rise in the violence and body count of the Indian 
campaign. Many cities were and had been autonomous for generations and readily 
expressed a strong sense of independence in the face of attempted conquest; men who 
held “an emotional love of freedom and a patriotic sense of honor,” were politically 
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 R. Stoneman, “India” in The Landmark Arrian, Appendix J, 376. While Arrian’s use of hyparches to 
describe native rulers (4.22.6; 5.8.2; 5.20.6) suggests that they were technically subjects, and while 
Alexander might have believed it so, the lack of aid from rajas like Musicanus, Sambus, and the 
autonomous (Arr. 6.14.2) Malli and Oxydracae suggests that “the arrangement must have lapsed” 
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territory. It seems more likely that Indian rajas were unconcerned with wars in the distant north and the 
problems of the Persian King and willing only to provide minimal aid in order to maintain tenuous relations 
with Persia and continue to be left to their own devices. 
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 Heckel, Conquests of Alexander the Great, 112-3. 
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distanced enough from the Persian Empire to see Alexander’s entry into and invasion of 
India as unjustifiable.
236
 Alexander’s policy of clemency in return for surrender was 
habitually combated by free peoples (Arr. 5.24.6), further indicating that the local rulers 
of India, “unlike the tribal chiefs of Central Asia, had never been fully incorporated into 
the Persian empire and were not accustomed to foreign domination.”237  
 
II. The Nature of Fighting in India 
a. The Assaceni  
 
The nature of fighting in India was another serious obstacle for the Macedonian 
army that ultimately culminated in greater violence against civilians. Because of the 
divided nature of West India, consisting of many local tribes and petty dynasts, 
Alexander was generally unable to force a single pitched battle to win the entirety 
territory, in accordance with Greek war practices.
238
 Instead, the king and his troops were 
obligated to chase after sporadic conflagrations of opposition and combat a particularly 
slippery resistance technique. Indian defenders would flee from one location or citadel to 
take refuge in another, forcing their enemy to prosecute siege after siege rather than 
quickly progressing further. This pattern began immediately upon the Macedonian 
invasion. After a skirmish at the Choes (Sind or Khonar) River in the Assaceni territory 
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 A.K. Narain, “India,” Impact of Alexander the Great, ed. E. Borza (Hinsdale: Dryden Press, 1974), 62.  
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 Romm, Landmark Arrian, 185. 
238
 The exceptions include a pitched battle in Western India against a large force of Indians whom 
Alexander defeated “without much trouble” (Arr. 4.25.1), Craterus’ land battle at Bazira, (Arr 4.27.8), and 
the only major pitched battle in India, the Hydaspes River: Diod. 17.87.1-17.89.3; Curt. 8.13.5-8.14.46; 
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of West India in 327, the Indian combatants fled to their stronghold and forced the 
Macedonians to besiege it. Before the walls were breached, the inhabitants fled once 
again into the mountains, leaving the invaders to raze the city and prevent it from being 
reoccupied.
239
  In some cases, Indians also favored razing their own cities to the ground, 
rather than leting the Macedonians take them, as occurred among the Aspasians and at 
Arigaion and Dyrta.
240
  
It is important to note that sieges along the Near-Eastern coast (334-332) were not 
nearly so numerous and frequent as those in India, and populations did not tend to scatter 
and take up a defense elsewhere, forcing Alexander to fight them anew. During Near-
Eastern sieges where populations did disperse such as at Halicarnassus, the citadels to 
which they fled after the destruction of Halicarnassus itself held no great importance for 
the region and could be bypassed.
241
 In India however, which had no overarching 
political structure like Persia’s satrapal system, Alexander was unable to win control of 
the entire land with a single pitched battle, as he had done at Gaugamela. In order to take 
over a region and its governing system, he had to defeat centers of resistance one by one, 
and no small regional fort could be left unassailed.
242
  
As Hanson notes, one of the virtues of a pitched battle, for which the Greeks and 
Macedonians were trained, was its relatively short duration. This is not to belittle the 
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 Arr. 4.23.1-5. See also the siege of Bazira, whose citizens fled before capitulating only to take up 
defense at Aornus (Arr.4.27.5-4.28.1). Cf. Bosworth, Alexander and the East, 49-50 and Conquest and 
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extent of suffering and injury of hoplite battles or larger-scale battles in Asia like 
Granicus or Gaugamela, but to emphasize the comparatively limited window of time in 
which wounds could be inflicted during a set battle as opposed to a siege. The latter 
might last for days or even months, as at Tyre in 332, and it offered opportunity for 
innovation and the use of new, less familiar weaponry.
243
  A battle, however, whenever it 
might be initiated, had to end by nightfall. Pitched battle came with the security and 
familiarity of routine to the Macedonians; there was an assurance of a (relatively) brief 
encounter, the use of familiar weapons and formation, and a decisive outcome.
244
 
Moreover, a siege in India did not always prove decisive. For example, the Assaceni in 
Western India (see above) were besieged successfully by the Macedonians (Arr. 4.23.1-
5), but the Indians rebelled less than a year later and killed their governor, requiring 
further attention (Arr. 5.20.7). 
The abandonment of cities and fortresses to flee further into India was a common 
Indian tactic of evasion, but when combined with Alexander’s treatment of fleeing locals 
as rebels, it resulted in a high death toll.
 245
 Arrian describes an attempt at pitched battle 
in the winter of 327/6 among the Assaceni (4.25.1-7) a people just east of the Gouraius 
(Panjkora) River who had gathered a substantial army of 30,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, 
and 30 elephants to combat the Macedonian approach.
246
 Upon seeing Alexander cross 
the river, and with great trouble at that, the Indians “disbanded, each to their several 
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Appendix D, 345), but their enemies’ weapons proved a difficult barrier (see further below).   
244
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  Romm,  Landmark Arrian, 227. 
246
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cities, which they intended to defend and preserve” (Arr. 4.25.5-7). Although ultimately 
the defense was futile, this technique forced the Macedonians to fight by blockade, likely 
dampening morale among the troops and increasing the time spent in battle and thus 
opportunity for injury. The need to quell a rebellion once and prevent it from reigniting 
after the army passed through the territory, risking exposing its rear and communication 
lines to revolting locals, contributed to a sense of haste and distrust of declarations of 
submission.
247
 Such a fear of rebellious flare-ups appeared in Alexander’s speech at the 
Hyphasis River in 326 when he reminded his men that “If we turn back, the tribes we do 
not now hold securely may be stirred up to rebel by those not yet under our control. And 
then many of our toils will be profitless, or else we shall have to again undertake fresh 
toils and dangers” (Arr. 5.26.3-4).  
b. Massaga 
 
The flight of the Assaceni described above led to a siege at their well-fortified 
capital Massaga which proved exceptionally difficult to carry out.
248
 Alexander attempted 
to prevent a long siege by drawing the defenders away from the walls and out into battle. 
The king feigned a retreat and lured the defenders outside of the walls to fight them, but 
they fled back to their stronghold “as soon as [the Assaceni] found themselves fighting at 
close quarters” (Arr. 4.26.4). The Indian defenders knew that it was most effective for 
them to fight from the safety of their citadel, and they only combated the Macedonians 
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directly when they were well within reach of it (cf. Arr. 4.26.7). The siege continued for 
four days until the Assaceni leader was killed.
249
 Alexander clearly needed to allow his 
enemies to come together en masse in order that he might combat and defeat them all at 
once, in accordance with Greco-Macedonian battle tradition.
250
 If he had been able to 
effect this, his progression through India would have been swifter and arguably less 
violent and discouraging for his troops. 
The consecutive sieges and skirmishes of India enhanced the likelihood of injury. 
Although the death toll for the army was not always necessarily high, on occasion and 
especially in the case of the siege at Sangala (pp. 91-2), “the number of wounded…was 
out of proportion to the number of dead” (Arr. 5.24.5). This is a ratio of 1200 :> 100, due 
in part to the fact that a siege did not allow for the protection of a phalanx, rendering 
troops vulnerable to traditional and makeshift projectiles, like the stones tossed down 
from the Massaga fortress.
251
 Alexander himself was wounded with an arrow in his ankle 
(Arr. 4.26.4; Curt. 8.10.30-1), and his soldiers suffered a serious setback when a bridge 
collapsed beneath them. In phalanx formation, troops crossed a bridge through a break in 
the defense walls which collapsed, signaling the defenders to assault the troops both from 
the walls and the ground level (Arr. 4.26.6-7). One can hardly imagine that there were not 
severe casualties, considering the weight of the soldiers’ armor and the weapons they 
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would have been brandishing.
252
 Given this violent episode, it is difficult to believe that 
only 25 Macedonians perished in the siege (Arr. 4.27.5), but regardless, the effort and 
injury it cost Alexander’s now veteran troops in combination with the series of sieges he 
prosecuted throughout the whole of India, interrupted only by one major battle, at the 
Hydaspes, had the effect of demoralizing and exhausting them.
253
 Furthermore, major or 
permanent injury might have threatened a soldier’s hope of returning home. That was 
why Alexander installed a number of wounded veterans in cities and garrison outposts in 
the East.
254
  
c. Sangala 
 
In 326 during the Macedonian army’s return march from outpost of the empire, at 
the Hyphasis River, it encountered resistance at Sangala, a fortress just east of the 
Acesines River.
255
 The combined autonomous tribes of the Malli, Oxydracai, and 
Cathaiae had come together to use this citadel as a basis of resistance.
256
 The defenders 
first met the Macedonians outside Sangala’s walls, and the Indians’ unconventional 
methods of battle unnerved their attackers. As in Sogdiana, the Macedonians had to 
contend with unfamiliar forms of war. Curtius explains that “the barbarians sallied 
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forth…with chariots joined together…with lances [and] axes, and they leaped rapidly 
from chariot to chariot, when they wished to aid their men who were under difficulties” 
(9.1.15-16; cf. Arr. 5.23.1). Even after dislodging the Indians from their chariots, the 
Macedonians had little success, as the defenders fled back inside the walls of their 
citadel. When the Indians realized that the Macedonians would penetrate their defensive 
structures eventually by siege, they attempted to flee during the night and were driven 
back inside, ultimately capitulating without having made terms and suffering enormous 
casualties.
257
 Importantly, the besieging army had endured a disproportionate casualty 
rate (see above p. 90) as well, testament to the strength of Assaceni defensive measures.  
Alexander’s response was preventive. He burned Sangala to ensure the citadel 
would not be re-occupied by fleeing forces, and for the same reasons he temporarily 
pursued the escaping defenders. In the end, the king gave Sangala’s surrounding territory 
to those autonomous Indians along the Acesines whom Arrian mentions at 5.24.8. This 
use (or production) of local enmity was intended to secure territory and prevent 
Alexander’s having to turn around and reclaim it, but may have served equally effectively 
at heightening tensions and prompting rebellions. At the same time, Alexander sent word 
to Sangala’s neighboring cities, which had revolted simultaneously with the large citadel. 
Although he had promised clemency to those who remained in their cities and “none of 
the other autonomous Indians who had surrendered willingly had been treated harshly” 
(Arr. 5.24.6), the neighbors of Sangala fled the army’s advance. Those who fled and were 
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apprehended by the army were killed, evidence of a strengthened Macedonian policy of 
no resistance. 
 
III.  A Policy of No Resistance 
 
Another key component in the rise of violence was Alexander’s response to 
resistance. The king pursued a policy that tolerated no opposition and did not generally 
spare a defiant civilian population, and this included those who fled.
258
 After the frequent 
and exhausting revolts of Bactria and Sogdiana which took two years of campaigning to 
quell, Alexander and his army expected rebellion and were less merciful in response to it. 
Two particular examples stand out:  the sieges of Massaga (327) and the Rock of Aornus 
(326). In both cases Alexander believed himself betrayed, which resulted in a radically 
violent treatment of native populations.  
After the siege of Massaga (pp. 89-91), the civilian population surrendered and 
reached an agreement with the king, who promised amnesty if the Indian mercenaries in 
Massaga would join his army. Alexander appears to have reneged on the deal by 
surrounding the mercenaries in their camp that night and killing them, but the sources 
differ on his action. Arrian explains that the Assaceni mercenaries intended to betray 
Alexander first, planning to flee in the night and likely station themselves elsewhere in 
defense, being “unwilling to bear arms against other Indians” (4.27.3). This does fit the 
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pattern of Alexander’s experience with Indian fighting, and regardless of whether or not 
these particular mercenaries intended to do so, it is not difficult to see why Alexander 
would believe it so, if he had been so informed.  
Diodorus explains the massacre differently, claiming that Alexander tricked the 
mercenaries by twisting his words. The king had only agreed to allow them to leave the 
city peacefully, not to be “friends of the Macedonians forever” (Diod. 17.84.2). 
Additionally, Diodorus relates that the mercenaries had brought along their wives and 
children with them, whom the Macedonians also slaughtered (17.84.2-6), which was 
entirely inconsistent with the Greek paradigm of warfare.
259
 Plutarch reports the carnage 
similarly, without mention of families, but provides no reason for Alexander’s doing so 
and says only that the king effectively “stained” his military career by slaughtering the 
mercenaries without provocation.
260
   
Diodorus hints at what is essentially a communication problem, in that Alexander 
conveniently altered the meaning of his words, and there may be some truth to this. 
Hamilton, in agreement with Tarn, postulates that the killing likely had something to do 
with a gross miscommunication combined with Alexander’s growing impatience.261 
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Alexander had formerly behaved with clemency upon a city’s surrender, as in the case of 
Nysa, which the Macedonians besieged in 327 until the leading politicians asked for 
peace.
262
 Alexander had also decimated populations of cities and razed them in cases of 
severe recalcitrance prior to Massaga.
263
 If he had wished to eliminate the Assaceni 
mercenaries, then he might have refused negotiations as “too little, too late,” and stormed 
the citadel without delay. Further, it would have been ill-advised to eliminate such a great 
source of manpower, especially individuals who were accustomed to Indian fighting 
tactics and the territory, and Alexander’s touted practicality would not have endured it. 
There must have been a genuine perception of an attempt at sedition. 
In either case, the fate of the Assaceni mercenaries created immediate difficulties 
in Alexander’s campaign. If Diodorus and Plutarch are correct that the killing of the 
Assaceni mercenaries was unjust, then does the act signal the beginning of Alexander’s 
rapidly-fraying temper? One would expect that, having secured their surrender, 
Alexander would make use of the native mercenaries to combat other Indian troops. Or, 
preferring them killed, that he might have refused peace negotiations as “too little, too 
late” and stormed the citadel without delay. It seems more likely that the slaughter 
stemmed not from temper but preventing further revolt in Assaceni territory. According 
to Arrian, Alexander supposed the inhabitants of the neighboring city Bazira (Bir-Kot) 
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would yield upon hearing that Massaga had fallen, but instead they decided to stand a 
siege, and Alexander’s attempt to secure a quick surrender did not work (4.27.5-6). After 
the nearby city of Ora fell in siege to the Macedonians, the Bazirans fled in the night 
along with other tribes of the region to the Rock of Aornus, the modern day slopes of Pir 
Sar and a fortress of Greek legend.
264
  
The details of the siege of Aornus are not discernable because of conflict within 
the sources, however Arrian’s account of a slaughter makes the event relevant here.265 
Arrian tells us that the defenders of the Rock agreed to terms of peace and to surrender 
the fortress to Alexander, but they attempted to flee in the night, and Alexander and his 
men slew them (4.30.2-4). Diodorus says that Alexander managed to fill up the 
surrounding ravine, and then drew up his siege engines on level with the defenders. In the 
night, the Macedonians abandoned their guard of the Rock’s major exits and allowed the 
occupants to flee “without further fighting” (17.85.7).266 If Arrian is to be believed, then 
the siege of Aornus further highlighted Alexander’s policy of treating fleeing individuals 
as rebellious. This reaction likely stemmed from haste in the face of slow progress 
through India and the assumption that those in flight would take up arms elsewhere and 
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force another siege. While cruelly logical, this sort of policy caused a steep rise in the 
Indian campaign’s death toll.  
The distrust of populations or leaders who flee instead of offering submission 
continued through the army’s march eastward.  King Porus, a cousin of the Porus who 
fought Alexander at the Hydaspes River, surrendered himself to Alexander through 
envoys (Arr. 5.21.3), but then recanted and fled his kingdom upon news of Alexander’s 
advance. Although this Porus was not technically in rebellion, Alexander distrusted his 
flight and refusal of earlier surrender, a detail which emerges in the epithet attached to 
Porus in the sources, “πῶρον τόν ἕτερον τόν κακόν” or “the other Porus, the Wicked.”267 
Alexander sent his general Hephaistion to commandeer “Porus the Wicked’s” lands and 
turn them over to Porus of the Hydaspes (Diod. 17.91.1-2; Arr. 5.21.3-6). This suggests 
that the flight of kings, like that of civilians, was also perceived as rebellion.   
Arrian’s detailed record of the siege of Sangala in the summer of 326 is another 
such example of Alexander’s policy of no resistance and its effect in the level of violence 
in the campaign (pp. 91-2). After the fortress fell to Alexander’s army, the king sent word 
to the people of the neighboring territories that they themselves “would suffer no harsh 
treatment” so long as they remained where they were (Arr. 5.24.6). Alexander’s goal was 
to ensure surrounding territories would remain passive and not take up arms against him 
or unify elsewhere, forcing another siege. When locals fled before his approach, they 
were treated as resisters in the same way the defenders at Sangala had been, and those 
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whom the army caught were killed.
268
 Although this was not an all-pervasive policy, we 
will see that cutting down fleeing rebels did occur in circumstances where large numbers 
of people had the potential to regroup elsewhere. Such was the case of the Malli, whose 
revolt Alexander had to put down a second time in 325.
269
 
 
IV. The Killing of Brahmans and the March Home 
 
a. Philosophers and Politicians  
 
 
 
Alexander’s decision to execute and allow the slaughter of Brahmans revealed a 
great degree of cultural misunderstanding, rather than a willful overturning of an entire 
system.
270
 The Macedonian understanding of the caste system and the role Brahmans 
played in society is difficult to grasp from a modern perspective. Today we easily 
perceive of India as a cultural whole and understand that regions once ruled by different 
political leaders were all connected by a caste system. This understanding makes it easy 
to condemn Alexander for accepting the venerated status of Brahmans when he found 
them as philosophers in Taxila, but then then slaughtering them in Malli. However, as 
Bosworth notes, Alexander might have witnessed the high esteem in which the Brahmans 
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of Taxila were held, but “he can hardly have realized the privileged position of the entire 
caste of Brahmans.”271 Although the Greeks had some knowledge about Indian 
topography, their understanding of customs and the intricacies of the caste system was 
limited and often “mixed with fable.”272  
Among the Greeks, Brahmans were equated with philosophers so that their 
position in society was seen as a profession rather than a status or caste. There was a 
constant filtering of Indian culture through a Greek lens and often a Greek mouth, pasting 
Greek terms onto a foreign system. Aristobolus calls them philosophers who differ in 
belief and practice (like the Greeks), and Nearchus refers to them as political advisors. 
The fact that Brahmans consist of an entire caste is not mentioned by those 
accompanying Alexander’s court in India, indicating there was not a total understanding 
of the system.
273
  Relative cultural ignorance upon arrival does not, however, excuse 
continued ignorance, especially after the introduction of Calanus, a Brahman from Taxila 
(Pakistan) to Alexander’s court in 326. Nevertheless, the linguistic and cultural 
translation of ideas proved a serious barrier in understanding the Brahmans’ social and 
religious functions and made total grasp of the caste system impossible.
274
 Because 
Indian customs were translated into Greek terms, often borrowed from philosophy, there 
was no real way to explain fully the untouchables, nor those who fell outside of the caste 
system. Slavery in India did not reflect slavery in Greece, but the word doulos was still 
                                                 
271
 Ibid., 95 (emphasis added).  
272
 Worthington, Alexander, 197. See further: Worthington, By the Spear, 257-8. 
273
 Bosworth, Alexander and the East, 90-3.  
274
 Bosworth, “Calanus ,” 197.  See further on cultural barriers: Worthington, By the Spear, 239-41. 
  
102 
 
used, implying a cultural parallel.
275
  The difficulty of language and of filtering societal 
descriptions through a western or Hellenic lens is an age-old problem. At Taxila, the 
Greek historian Onesicritus was sent to interview the ascetics and had need of a string of 
three interpreters in order to do so.
276
 This detail gives us a new perspective on 
Alexander’s supposed direct conversation with Calanus (Plut. Alex. 65.2-4; Arr. 7.2.1-4), 
which loses some of its potency when imagined occurring through a chain of other 
interpreters, though it is likely that the two did converse.  
Calanus would have been a significant resource for Alexander’s understanding of 
Brahmans, and he seems to have been a respected figure of the king’s court.277 The 
presence of a Brahman in the Macedonian court begs the question why did Alexander and 
his men not come to grips with the basic tenets of the caste system and avoid the 
slaughter of Brahmans? If Calanus advised Alexander against the killing of Brahmans, 
“he was notably unsuccessful.”278 However, it is possible that Calanus did not play the 
role of an informer, but chose to follow Alexander’s court because he had become 
disillusioned about the Brahman way of life and wished to abandon the unappealing 
aspects of it. His conduct, upon careful inspection, includes proscribed Brahman 
behavior. For example, when Calanus decided to commit ritual suicide through self-
immolation in the spring of 324 (Arr. 7.3.1-6), he exhorted the Macedonians to celebrate 
and “make that day one of pleasure and revelry (μεθυσθῆναι) with the king” (Plut. Alex. 
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69.3). Plutarch’s attribution of the word μεθυσθῆναι to Calanus is specific; this term 
connotes drinking and is in direct violation of the Laws of Manu that govern Brahman 
behavior. If this suggests that Calanus had assimilated to the Macedonian court, then it 
might have further contributed to the Indian perception of the invaders as a morally 
corrosive entity and prompted Brahman-backed rebellion.
279
  
 However, this response may also be in part the result of religious factionalism. 
Despite the Laws of Manu, drinking was not wholly foreign to Brahmans, and in fact 
those of North West India were known to do so. While alcohol was tolerated there, the 
“purists” of the caste strongly objected to it, as evidenced by the deprecation of Calanus 
in the writer Megasthenes’ Indica, written in Taxila soon after Alexander’s campaign. 
According to Brahmans in Taxila, Calanus’ own homeland, even Calanus’ mode of death 
was evidence of intemperance and antithetical to Brahmanic dogma. Different sources 
depict his suicide and its place in Brahman regulations in very different lights, 
exemplifying a “fissure in belief and practice”280 by region. These differing religious 
perspectives, if Brahmans serve as advisors, could also yield varying systems of rule and 
responses. The difference in perceptions of Calanus in India, expressed in the works of 
Arrian, Megasthenes, and Onesicritus, is reason enough to see “animosity within the 
Brahman community,” even if “it may be an overstatement to categorize the differences 
as a schism.”281 A consistency which may be drawn from this is that as in most 
widespread religions, sects, variations, and strong disagreements over key components 
occurred. Among the Brahmans, differing beliefs about the necessity of an ascetic life, 
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proper modes of suicide, and importantly the consumption of wine contributed to the 
perception of Alexander’s court and its effect on the behavior of Indian holy people and 
political notables.  
Even provided a complete understanding of the dual religious and political roles 
of the Brahmans, Alexander would not have been able to appeal directly to Indian 
religious sentiment as he had done elsewhere. In 332 in Egypt, he showed great respect to 
the native religion of the Egyptians through his sacrifices to the sacred bull Apis (Arr. 
3.1.4), and in Babylon he performed traditional sacrificial rituals among the Chaldeans 
and ordered the reconstruction of the temple of Bel (Arr. 3.16.4-5). In Egypt and 
Babylon, key regions of the Persian Empire, Alexander had the advantage of succeeding 
religious oppressors.
282
 In India, long removed from any direct Persian control, 
Alexander’s entry made him the oppressor, and a foreigner as well who could belong to 
no caste. Calanus’ presence, being an unconventional example of a Brahman, may have 
promoted the alienation of more cohesive Brahman sects elsewhere.
283
  
It is also possible that Alexander was less concerned with appealing to local 
cultural traditions in India because he did not intend to be perceived as an Indian ruler. 
He was the heir to the Achaemenid throne in Persia, the Pharaonic tradition in Egypt, but 
would, as Darius I had done, rule India from afar. He had no need to be perceived as 
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“Indian” in part, and if he understood anything about the caste system, he would have 
known that he, being Macedonian, could not have been incorporated into it. Alexander 
never actively repressed the practice of religion. In India there was no destruction of 
shrines or condemnation of holy rituals, only of holy individuals involved in political 
resistance because of their combined religious-advisory role. Nor, however, did 
Alexander attempt to transform himself into an Indian king.   
Thus it is possible that Alexander’s court and regional differences within the 
Brahman caste of West India promoted stronger struggle against the invaders. However, 
Alexander’s policy of no prisoners contributed heavily as well to the rise in violence in 
India.
284
 The killing of Brahmans occurs in the sources in three primary locations: the 
Malli, the Kingdom of Sambus, and that of Musicanus. On these three occasions, 
Alexander’s army slaughtered Brahmans not in a concerted effort of religious oppression, 
but with the desire to crush political resistance. 
 
b. The Malli 
 
On his return march from the Hyphasis, Alexander crossed through the Malli region 
again to secure his territory before leaving India.
285
 The Macedonian army had defeated 
Malli tribesmen earlier at Sangala in the summer of 326, at which time the Malli had 
united with their neighbors the Oxydracae and the Cathaiae (Arr. 5.22.1-3; see pp. 91-2). 
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When Alexander crossed through the southern Malli territory in the winter of 326/5, the 
Malli tribes’ preparations to fight constituted rebellion. 286 It is not surprising that 
Alexander wished to cut the Malli off from uniting with the Oxydracae, aware that the 
Indians would prefer a drawn-out siege to a pitched battle. Alexander did not want to risk 
another siege like Sangala, especially with his men having overtly expressed their desire 
to return home at the Hyphasis.
287
 
A change occurred in the execution of Alexander’s policy during the Malli campaign. 
Nominally maintaining his usual policy of leniency in the case of surrender and the use of 
force otherwise (Arr. 6.4.2), Alexander’s rapidity and unexpected approach through the 
desert (6.6.3) took the Mallians by surprise, giving them no opportunity to submit or 
prepare against him, rendering his offer of clemency relatively meaningless. It should be 
noted however that Diodorus contradicts this, affirming that “[Alexander] found them 
mobilized in force, eighty thousand infantry, ten thousand cavalry, and seven hundred 
chariots” (17.98.1). However, Arrian’s account is far more detailed (6.6.1-6.11.2), 
providing the accounts of several sieges. Diodorus mentions only the siege in which 
Alexander is injured, which suggests that the Malli of that particular fort were mobilized, 
but those of the first, unnamed fortress (mentioned only by Arrian) were not expecting 
Alexander. Arrian’s close focus on the Macedonians’ surprise attack strongly suggests 
that the first assault, at least, was unexpected.  
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The Malli of the first (unnamed) city were ambushed from the desert and cut 
down fleeing and unarmed, and Alexander and his men besieged the city thereafter, 
killing its 2,000 occupants after breaching the walls (Arr.6.6.3-6).  A contingent of the 
Macedonian army under Perdiccas’ leadership marched to a neighboring city to prevent 
the escape of civilians and their spreading word of Alexander’s presence while extending 
the same harsh policy. Finding the city deserted, Perdiccas interpreted flight as rebellion, 
chased down refugees, and “killed everyone except for those who escaped into the 
marshes” (Arr. 6.6.6).  This seems to be the beginning of the disintegration of 
Alexander’s policy of clemency towards those who might surrender. Not only does he not 
give the first Mallian citadel the opportunity to do so, he stations his men about it to 
prevent anyone from escaping and warning other cities in the region of his approach.
 288
 It 
seems logical that, if anything, Alexander considered these tribes already under his 
dominion, and they were not offered a chance at surrender because they had already 
made war against him at Sangala, and lost. That, combined with the mounting frustration 
of a harried campaign, demoralized soldiers, and the need to stabilize his territory before 
leaving it to Macedonian satraps, necessitated a fiercer policy which dramatically 
escalated the rate of violence in his campaign.  
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 The cost of the Malli campaign rose with the destruction of Arrian’s “city of 
Brahmans.”289 This episode is somewhat different from its predecessors because it 
constituted not only an attack on a locality, but on culture, custom, and religion. Many 
Brahmans among the Malli were householders and even warriors, distinct from the 
ksatrya (warrior) caste, but unrecognizable as Brahmans to the Macedonians. It is very 
unlikely that the Macedonians would have recognized men working in the fields outside 
the city or bearing arms like soldiers as Brahmans.
290
 Such an error highlights the Greek 
tendency to view Brahmans by profession rather than by caste, a mistake which only 
heightened resistance of neighboring territories. Like Brahmans, farmers were also 
inviolable during wartime. We might imagine as well that some of the men Arrian 
describes as outside the city and unarmed were farmers; statistically that seems difficult 
to avoid, given the inherently agricultural nature of most pre-industrial cities. The Greek 
rules of war often involved ravaging fields and potentially attacking farmers.
291
 In India, 
however, farmers and their lands were protected by law even during wartime. Diodorus 
tells us that they were “sacred and inviolable…while opposing sides kill each other in 
battle, they allow those at work on the farms to remain unhurt, acknowledging them as 
the common benefactors of everyone” (2.36.6-7).292 Arrian explains along the same lines 
that “it is not lawful to touch these workers.”293 Even if the sources do not explicitly 
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name farmers among those cut down in surprise by Alexander in the first Malli city, it 
stands to reason that they, of anyone, would be passing time beyond the city walls. The 
fact that “few were taken alive” (Arr. 6.7.6) after besieging the City of Brahmans is 
highly suggestive of the death of farmers as well. Macedonian disregard for the Indian 
rules of war made the campaign appear to be one of religious persecution, which only 
intensified conflict. How could a region risk surrender to a man who did not appear to 
follow the rules of war as Indians understood them? The Indians were likely as 
confounded by the Greek approach to war as Alexander’s army was by the Indian 
defense.   
While cowing the enemy into surrender worked in the case of the unnamed West 
Indian city in 327, winning immediate capitulation from its neighbor Andaca (Arr. 
4.23.4-5),  Alexander did not see the same results on his return march West in 325. The 
slaughter of Brahman caste members strengthened local resistance by infusing it with a 
moral undertone. Alexander responded with brutally repressive measures, ordering 
Peithon and Demetrius to hunt out fleeing Malli from yet another (unnamed) region 
which he found abandoned. Finding “the largest city of the Malli” similarly deserted, 
Alexander pursued its inhabitants to the Hydraotes River (Ravi) where 50,000 Mallian 
troops had assembled to stave off the Macedonians’ advance. Likely hopeful of a pitched 
battle, Alexander and his men must have been greatly frustrated to see the army break up 
upon the arrival of Macedonian infantry, fleeing to the nearest citadel (likely Multan) and 
forcing another siege (Arr. 6.8.1-8). It is at this city where the greatest carnage took place 
and where Alexander receives his near-fatal lung wound. The wholesale slaughter of the 
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population is a result of Alexander’s policy of no resistance, 294 the degree of trouble this 
particular band of Malli caused the Macedonians who pursued them across the 
countryside, and perhaps most significantly, the troops’ reaction to Alexander’s injury.295 
Once begun, such a policy can hardly be discarded; although the remaining Malli cities 
and the Oxydracae surrendered, the Brahmans of Musicanus’ and Sambus’ realm incited 
a revolt. 
c. Musicanus and Sambus 
 
In the spring of 325, the region of the petty king Musicanus had surrendered to 
Alexander, but Musicanus rebelled once the Macedonian army had passed further 
south.
296
 According to Arrian, the Brahmans of the region had catalyzed the revolt, and 
Alexander executed them alongside their king for treachery.
297
 The king’s orders that 
Musicanus “be hanged in his own country along with the Brahmans who were 
responsible for the revolt” (Arr. 6.17.2) suggests that the Brahmans were perceived as 
political advisors rather than priests or philosophers like Calanus. Alexander’s behavior 
was certainly not an attempt at the eradication of an entire caste, in which case we would 
probably hear of the hanging or execution of Brahman women as well.  
Between the time of Musicanus’ initial surrender and later revolt, Alexander 
entered the kingdom of Sambus, the “self-appointed satrap of the Mountain Indians” 
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(Arr. 6.16.3).
298
 According to Arrian, Sambus’ family and capital Sindimana surrendered 
after the king fled, and there is no record of harm coming to it specifically. At least one 
city in the region, Harmatelia, was violently brought to submission.
299
 Harmatelia had 
revolted under the prompting of Brahmans, and these “wise men among the Indians” 
were executed for their instigation of rebellion (Arr. 6.16.5). Cleitarchus’ report, used by 
Diodorus and Curtius, that 80,000 Indians were slain during the campaign suggests that 
more than one city offered resistance, and Arrian likely glossed the campaign by 
mentioning the most important.
300
 The figure seems an exaggeration,
301
 but it does 
emphasize the widespread struggle throughout the region, and the actual death toll was 
undoubtedly very high. Revolts beyond Harmatelia, where the ruling family had 
surrendered, were likely also ignited by Brahmans. The treatment of Brahmans was brutal 
because of the widespread political resistance in the region, and Alexander’s policy of no 
resistance meant, once again, persistent conquest. Diodorus explains that when the 
Brahmans did surrender (once again, suggesting they were the perpetrators of the 
resistance), they appeared to the king with branches in their hands and Alexander made 
terms, only “punishing the most guilty.” 302 In the case of Porticanus’ kingdom in the 
Indus Valley (325), any widespread slaughter beyond the king’s citadel was cut short by 
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 For Sambus see: Diod. 17.102.6-7; Plut. Alex. 64.1; Curt. 9.8.13-16; Arr. 6.16.3-5; Bosworth, Alexander 
and the East, 94-5.  
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 Diodorus reports most cities were razed, their populations enslaved or killed (17.102.6). On the name 
Harmatelia: Diod. 17.103.5. Arrian does not name the city.  
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 Diod. 17.102; Curt. 9.8.15; Arr. 6.16.3-5.  
301
 Cf. Romm, Landmark Arrian, 253. 
302
 Diod. 17.102.7. Plutarch’s account mentions nothing of execution. It focuses on the questioning of the 
gymnosophists occurs in Sambus’ realm, what he calls the “Sabbas revolt,” but the questioning turns 
philosophical and seems to have little to do with any relevant inquiries Alexander might have had for the 
men. The fact that Plutarch has the incident preceding Alexander’s entry into Taxila and echoing themes of 
apotheosis makes the incident an unlikely anecdote (Plut. Alex. 64.1-.5). 
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immediate capitulation in the surrounding region.
303
 Although there were undoubtedly 
Brahmans dwelling among the Praesti of Porticanus’ realm, no mention is made of their 
execution because they do not appear to have initiated prolonged revolt, indicating that 
the ongoing brutality was the result not of any religious persecution, but the same, if 
increasingly impatient, policy against opposition.  
Heavy fighting at the end of Alexander’s campaign was in part the result of 
policy. The need to leave West Indian territory secured under the satrap Peithon meant 
weeding out dissent and potential revolts before departing with his army.
304
 His error in 
failing to recognize warriors and land-holders as Brahmans and then killing a number of 
them in Malli set off a chain reaction of resistance that Arrian glosses as an Indian desire 
for independence, but in reality was likely in large part furious defiance on moral and 
religious grounds. This spread south faster than Alexander’s army could travel,305 
resulting in passionate opposition to and terror of an individual who did not feel bound by 
Indian religious and cultural law. Alexander’s entry into India and tendency to operate 
according to the western rules of war damaged his ability to win the easy surrender of 
many cities, especially those heavily dominated by Brahman advisors. As a result, the 
degree of violence necessary to subdue the region, most especially that below the 
confluence of the Indus and Hyphasis, steepened considerably. 
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 Arrian calls Porticanus Oxycanus, and although his, Diodorus’, and Curtius’ accounts of the king’s 
death vary slightly, none of them record an extensive slaughter. Diod. 17.102.5; Curt. 9.8.11-13; Arr. 
6.16.1-2. 
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 A.B. Bosworth, “The Indian Satrapies Under Alexander the Great,” Antichthon 17 (1983): 37. 
[Reprinted in Alexander the Great: A Reader (ed) I. Worthington (New York: Routledge, 2012), 237-44.] 
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 Arrian hints at evidence of how news outpaced the Macedonian army in his discussion of the ruler of 
Patala’s surrender to Alexander. After the execution of Musicanus, the ruler of Patala, in the Indus Delta, 
offered surrender to Alexander in advance, clearly having received word both of his presence and, very 
likely, of Musicanus’ and his Brahmans’ fates (Arr. 6.17.2-3). See also Bosworth, Alexander and the East, 
95-7. 
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V. War Weariness and Violence 
 
While Alexander’s decisions affected the casualty rate, determining when and 
whether to assault a city, Alexander himself was not singularly responsible for every 
death in his campaign. There had to have been willingness among his men, too, to carry 
out such wholesale slaughter. The experience of Alexander’s soldiers is difficult to 
reconstruct, but Coenus’ speech at the Hyphasis, a much-contested passage of Curtius 
and Arrian, provides us with potential insight into the worries of the Macedonians. 
Glimpses of the concerns of generals, like Craterus’ harangue of Alexander after Mallia 
in Curtius, are also invaluable; even though their words are doubtless inventions of the 
historian often couched in elegant phrasing, it is possible to understand the themes or 
“gist” of the speeches as true.306 Coenus’ speech, made on behalf of the army, is 
invaluable because it expounds reasons for the men’s exhaustion, frustration, and 
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 Although there is no way to prove the veracity or falsity of the speech, it is the only direct and 
substantial passage detailing the mindset of a non-general and cannot be cast aside based merely upon 
suspicion. In their works on Alexander, Bosworth, Heckel, and Worthington all give a nod to the speech 
without necessarily dissecting it, and for the sake of this work I intend to treat it with the understanding that 
the message and themes, although not the rhetoric and syntax, are historical. See Bosworth, Conquest and 
Empire, 133; Heckel, Conquests of Alexander the Great, 123; Worthington, By the Spear, 252-3.  
    In Bosworth’s assessment, the speeches Arrian gives both Alexander and Coenus at Hyphasis are 
“mostly elaborate and empty rhetoric” (Bosworth, Commentary 2, 344), and Curtius’ version is much the 
same; both authors use the occasion to consider Alexander’s imperialism, a common Roman rhetorical 
topos. While the rhetoric cannot be given credit as historical and any firm source for Arrian’s version of the 
speech is denied by Bosworth, that does not mean that the details woven into Coenus’ reply concerning life 
in the Macedonian army are assuredly false. 
 Baynham, in her discussion of Curtius’ use of speeches, emphasizes that although theory and practice do 
not always match up, it was expected that “a verus historicus should tell the truth, and this convention 
extended to the accurate reporting of speeches” (Baynham, Alexander the Great: The Unique History of 
Quintus Curtius [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998], 46). When Curtius uses rhetoric to 
enhance, alter, or fabricate entirely what was initially said, he does not necessarily destroy or obscure the 
gist of what was in the original source. See further Baynham, Alexander, 46-56.   
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diminished morale, which arguably contribute to their haste and brutality in war, linked 
to their fierce desire to return home. Alexander’s tendency to put himself more directly in 
harm’s way and the need to protect him and their passage home leads the army to 
sporadic bouts of almost frenzied violence. In addition, the unique physical landscape of 
India—the flora and fauna and weather—made for a cruel extended campaign.   
Ascribing the increase in violence in India to war-weariness is not an unjust 
assessment when the condition is parsed beyond the simple meaning of exhaustion. 
While terms like post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are too culturally specific to 
superimpose upon the ancient world,
307
 it is reasonable that some human responses to war 
have remained unchanged between antiquity and modernity. Every army has a breaking 
point, a degree of frustration and exhaustion beyond which nothing further can be 
endured. Alexander’s army reached that point at the Hyphasis.  
 
a. Endless Sieges and the Unfair Fight 
 
Faced with unending sieges which, as discussed above, ran contrary to war as 
they understood and took pride in it, the Macedonians’ motivation and sense of purpose 
had become considerably corroded. By the Hyphasis, Alexander’s men had travelled over 
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 Tritle,From Melos To My Lai, 55-60, argues that the Spartan Clearchus, as a philopolemos, a “lover of 
war,” suffered from PTSD and that “little separates Clearchus from those soldiers [Tritle] knew in 
Vietnam” (55). Although his use of Judith Herman’s Trauma and Recovery assessment of “psychological 
arousal” has its roots in biology and neuroscience which, arguably, has not much altered in the course of 
human evolution between Alexander’s day and the present, I hesitate to employ culturally and 
chronologically specific terms like PTSD when describing the condition of soldiers in antiquity. I do not, 
however, find that parallels between ancient warfare and American experiences in Vietnam (especially 
considering the clash of western and guerilla warfare) are entirely unwarranted. Cf. Worthington, By the 
Spear, 283-8. 
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11,250 miles with him,
308
 and the clear purpose with which they set out, to bring down 
the Persian Empire, had been long since accomplished. India, however, seemed to have 
no end, and the perpetual prosecution of sieges made the army vulnerable. Coenus 
explains: “Look at our bodies, debilitated, pierced with all those wounds, decaying with 
all their scars” (Curt. 9.3.10)! The Macedonians had accumulated a number of injuries, 
and the chance of receiving an incapacitating wound put their hopes of returning home at 
risk.      
The disdained use of distanced fighting in India demoralized soldiers and seemed 
to deprive them of a “fair” fight.309  Curtius emphasizes just such mentality during the 
crossing of the Hydraotes (cf. Sangala pp. 91-2); the Indians would fight from chariots 
and at a distance, refusing to stand and conduct battle in such a way as to lead to an 
othismos: “At first this strange style of combat terrified the Macedonians, who were 
sustaining wounds at long range, but their fear was soon replaced by contempt for such 
undisciplined tactics.” 310 The Indians’ use of poison-tipped arrows threatened an 
agonizing and undignified death, perhaps from an enemy one never lays eyes upon. 
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 Wilcken, Alexander, 186.  
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 Hanson, Western Way of War, 14-16. For a discussion of “unfair” siege weapons and the moral 
ambiguity that surrounded it even as sieges became more common, see Adrienne Mayor, Greek Fire, 
Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs (Woodstock: Overlook, 2003), 30-31. 
310
 Curt. 9.1.16. Even the Indians’ manner of fighting pitched battle, to which the Macedonians were 
accustomed, proved initially terrifying because of their use of war elephants. Although elephants had 
appeared as early as Gaugamela (Arr.3.8.6), there were reportedly only fifteen, a small portion of the 
Persian enemy. The Battle of the Hydaspes was the Macedonians’ first thorough exposure to elephants in 
battle, whose strange appearance unnerved not only the troops, but terrified the horses (Arr. 5.10.1-2). Just 
as facing elephants, a new weapon and vehicle of war, proved terrifying, so arguably did the sly and 
evasive tactics of the Indians that made victory difficult to distinguish.  
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Death by the thrust of a spear or blow of a club could be honorable, but to die miserably 
because of a small nick from a toxic arrow is another thing entirely,
311
 as:  
“When a man was wounded, the body became numb 
immediately and then sharp pains followed, and convulsions and 
shivering shook the whole frame. The skin became cold and livid 
and bile appeared in the vomit, while a black froth was exuded 
from the wound and gangrene set in. As this spread quickly and 
overran to the vital parts of the body, it brought a horrible death to 
the victim” (Diod. 17.103.5). 
 
Mayor has identified the poison as Russel’s viper venom based on physical 
reactions to the toxin. Although cobras dwell in India as well and are commonly thought 
the source of such poisons, a cobra’s venom kills quickly by asphyxiation and does not 
produce the grotesque spectacle which a viper’s venom might; the effects of the poison 
are as important as their ultimate conclusion, as they were undoubtedly used for 
psychological as well as physical attacks.
312
 Foreknowledge of a city’s ghastly armory 
might dissuade attackers, and as Mayor points out, it is likely for this reason that the 
Scythians were so free with the recipe for their own lethal concoction.  Facing such a 
threat, it is not difficult to see how the Macedonians’ contempt for a perceived cowardly 
fighting style could translate easily into a surge in violence, a combination of desperation 
to push past yet another capture and to lash out against those who threatened inglorious 
death. Massacres on citadel occupants after a siege were as much pre-emptive against 
later rebellion as they were punitive. 
                                                 
311
 Mayor, Greek Fire, 61. Mayor suggests that this sort of suffering might bring to mind the sad fate of 
Philoctetes, an Achaean abandoned by his comrades en route to Troy when he was accidentally wounded 
by one of Heracles’ poison arrows, resulting in an infected injury that refused to close and pained him 
throughout the war. Parallels with Homer continue in Alexander’s constant sieges in India, but the Indians 
were not fighting Homerically. Rather than sallying forth to fight before the city walls in hand-to-hand 
combat, Indians found it more effective to engage in combat from a distance.  
312
 Ibid., 90.  
  
117 
 
b. The Importance of Pitched Battles 
 
The importance of pitched battle to the morale of the army is highlighted by 
Alexander celebrating his victory at the Hydaspes with a competition in athletics and 
horsemanship at the river (Arr. 5.20.1).  His victory over Porus and his elephant-mounted 
army was a considerable feat, to which Arrian devotes more detail than any other single 
event,
313
 including the sieges of Malli where Alexander was almost fatally injured. In 
addition, Alexander founded two cities: Nicaea (victory city) and Bucephala (Jhelum), 
honoring Bucephalus who died of battle injuries.
314
 He also had elephant medallions to 
memorialize the Hydaspes victory, which had on the reverse a soldier on horseback 
(likely Alexander) in monomachia against a man mounted on an elephant. The 
medallions appear to memorialize the Macedonian success against an Indian king’s army 
of elephants,
 
depicting on the reverse a soldier on horseback (Alexander) in monomachia 
against a man mounted on an elephant.
 315
 It is significant that of the many sieges and 
skirmishes which the Macedonians fought in India, only the battle was used as a source 
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 The account of the Hydaspes and its aftermath lasts in Arrian from 5.8.4-5.20.4. Even the account of the 
unnamed Mallian fortress where Alexander was injured endures only from 6.8.1-6.12.3. This might suggest 
that greater detail of the land battle was available in the original sources, Ptolemy’s, Aristoboulus’, or that 
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glory of a pitched battle, rather than the details of a siege. Diodorus too gives it a comparatively extensive 
description, from 17.87-17.89.4, larger than the siege of Aornus and its accompanying legends (17.85-
17.86.3).  
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 Plut. Alex. 61. Interestingly, Hamilton contends that Bucephalus may well have died of old age, 
supporting the tradition that he was 30 years old (Hamilton, Commentary, 169). 
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 See Bosworth Conquest and Empire, 130; Holt, Alexander the Great and the Mystery of the Elephant 
Medallions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003);  Romm, Landmark Arrian, 216; Heckel 
Conquests of Alexander the Great 124-5; Worthington, By the Spear, 249. 
   For competing theories and thorough analysis see Frank Holt, Elephant Medallions. Holt accepts the 
scholarly consensus that the figure with a thunderbolt on the reverse represents Alexander, but he discards 
the notion, and rightly I think, that the medallions might represent Alexander’s other battle against 
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of victory propaganda by the king.
316
 After considering the unusual markings and weights 
of the coins as well as their relative rarity, Holt concludes that they were not currency but 
commemorative coins awarded to Alexander’s men a combination of payment and 
trophy.
317
 Holt posits that the Alexander keraunophoros figure on the reverse of the 
medallion symbolized divine leadership and Alexander’s control of the weather, which 
seems extreme. However, his emphasis on the unusual lack of label does lead one to 
think that the medallions were intended for those who could pick up on contextual clues 
because of their own experience.
318
 Later, Alexander and the elephant came to serve as an 
emblem of the king’s martial prowess and the wide-reaching extent of his empire, and he 
was portrayed on coinage wearing the scalp of an elephant by Ptolemy I.
319
 Alexander 
and the Macedonians marched farther than Dionysus into India, capturing the legendary 
Rock of Aornus and spending most of their battle hours prosecuting sieges. The Battle of 
the Hydaspes was arguably the most momentous of their undertakings in India.
320
 It 
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 Further, Bosworth notes that the post-Hydaspes victory celebrations are the only ones mentioned in 
Arrian’s entire account (Bosworth, Commentary 2, 316). While from a modern perspective Gaugamela 
appears by far the most significant battle, “what really matters is the mindset of Alexander and his troops” 
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 For scholarship against this point of view, see Worthington, By the Spear, 249 n.32.  
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 Holt, Elephant Medallions, 146-150. See chapter 7 especially. Regarding the reverse of the medallion, 
which shows Alexander in battle gear and chlamys being crowned by Nike and wielding a thunderbolt, Holt 
asserts that Alexander takes credit through the coins for the lightning storm that covered the Macedonians’ 
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leadership” by “remind[ing] men that have grown wearied and worried that he has special powers to 
exercise on their behalf” (155). While I find his argument regarding the purpose of the medallions 
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 Silver tetradrachm minted by Ptolemy I Soter of Egypt. Alexander/Zeus Ca. 321-315 B.C. Private 
collection. Out of A. Stewart Faces of Power: Alexander’s Image and Hellenistic Politics (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994), Fig. 77. 
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 Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 126-30. Worthington, By the Spear, 243-50. 
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allowed the Macedonians to perform in battle as they were accustomed and for a shorter 
duration, and to risk a glorious death in hand to hand combat.   
 
c. A Disheartened Army  
 
The army’s constant occupation with sieges saw a mounting death toll as it 
progressed through India. The men were eager to return home, no longer in possession of 
“the bodily vigor they once had, while their spirits h[ad] sunk even further” (Arr. 5.27.6). 
The army’s disheartened state was in part due to the condition of its armor. At the 
Hyphasis, Coenus declared, “Our weapons are already blunt, our armor is wearing 
out…How many of us have cuirasses? Who owns a horse?” (Curt. 9.3.10-11).  The 
persistent monsoon rains that plagued the Macedonians for seventy days wore out their 
armor, which would have provided a daily visual reminder of the duration and difficulties 
of the army’s eight year (334-326) campaign.321 Diodorus notes that those horses present 
had hooves “worn thin by steady marching” (Diod. 17.94.2) and likewise emphasizes the 
sorry state of the troops’ armor.322 It is reasonable to assume that a large part of the 
reason for the army’s refusal to march further stemmed from a feeling of exposure. 
Coenus asked his king, “Will you expose this fine army naked to wild beasts” (Curt. 
9.3.12)? Not only were the Macedonians insecure in their inability to make use of the 
                                                 
321
 Diod. 17.94.3. For a summary of the difficulties of the Indian campaign see Worthington, By the Spear, 
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phalanx formation because of siege warfare, their armor and weapons appeared to be 
falling apart on them.  
A similar effect can be seen today in war. In 2004, the process of supplying U.S. 
soldiers with ceramic-plated body armor stalled significantly, with the result that almost a 
fourth of American troops in Iraq were without armor. In order to avoid the risk of 
passing months with incomplete or substandard protection, many soldiers and their 
families invested in their own armor, buying Kevlar vests independently.  The terror a 
state of improper protection produced among present-day soldiers, and the distrust of the 
government and military among families, echo some of the themes in Coenus’ speech 
millennia earlier.
323
 
Unlike today, however, in antiquity armor was highly individualized, an extension 
of personal identity and a great source of pride. Vase paintings suggest uniquely-styled 
helmets, individually patterned breastplates, and other personal modifications that lend a 
soldier a sense of individuality,
324
 a characteristic discouraged in modern military 
practice. Although Alexander supplied his men with arms, many of them likely marched 
out in their own, either custom-made or inherited, and felt the loss of it. Additionally, 
Coenus pointed out that not only was their armor decaying, but also that “we put on 
Persian dress because our own cannot be brought out to us—we have stooped to wearing 
the clothes of foreigners” (Curt. 9.3.10)! The wearing out of the troops’ clothing likely 
did occur and may have been hastened by the especially damp conditions of India’s 
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monsoon season. In India cotton, not wool, would have been available for the production 
of clothing, and cotton is generally a thinner, lighter material that would not have held up 
well underneath armor.
 325
  The psychological effect of marching and fighting in clothing 
that is not one’s own, of dressing like a foreigner while traveling through foreign lands in 
antiquity, cannot be underestimated. To redress the men’s grievances and mood, 
Alexander ordered 25,000 sets of armor, finely-wrought and “emblazoned with gold and 
silver” (Curt. 9.3.21), after he ended the mutiny. Further, in perhaps a symbolic attempt at 
destroying trepidation and disheartenment, he ordered all the old armor burned (Curt. 
9.3.22).  
 But the damage had been done. The extreme cultural seclusion experienced in 
India and the forced change in the troops’ behavior and lifestyle distanced them from 
their identity, making behavior that would not in most cases have been possible—the 
easy slaughter of unarmed men and the preference for killing, rather than enslaving, 
civilians—acceptable.326 They were not fighting in the Greek way because they were not 
fighting a Greek war. Additionally, the army was not fighting Greeks or a traditional 
Greek enemy. The Indians were culturally and ethnically distinct, but it is not viable that 
the increased carnage in India is the result of the Indians’ physical appearance or the fact 
that they appeared darker-skinned than the Macedonians, hence it was not an issue of 
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race.
327
 Rather, the Greeks operated by the recognition of ethnos, of which physical 
characteristics were only a small part, and not even consistent markers. “Common traits,” 
according to Konstan, who gives the example of red-haired Thracian slaves, “do not 
constitute an ethnic self-awareness.”328 Ethnicity is constructed based on a number of 
shared characteristics, and it is a “reactive phenomenon” that arises in the presence of an 
“other.”329  
Although Indians would certainly have been recognized as “other,” so too would 
have been the Egyptians, Persians, Medians, Bactrians, and Sogdians, and closer to home 
the Thracians and European Scythians. The differing treatment of Indians and the 
violence used against them cannot be solely explained by their physical “otherness,” 
because the same behavior does not occur throughout the entirety of Alexander’s 
campaign. The possibility that the Indians exhibited a greater degree of “otherness” 
seems also unlikely, given Arrian’s easy comparison of them to two other peoples, the 
Ethiopians and the Egyptians.
 330
  How could the Indians be unique in meriting this 
violence because they appeared somehow more foreign than any other peoples? It seems 
more likely that the altered nature of war, the Macedonians’ being away from their 
                                                 
327
 It is a difficult concept to discuss because of how greatly it affects modern scholarship. Kathleen Brown 
posits that the modern construct of race which we know and make use of today is a recent occurrence, 
distinct from any concept of physical difference in the pre-modern periods. Even English travelers of the 
late 1500s evaluated African culture based on a variety of factors, mentioning but not consistently focusing 
on physical appearances. See Brown, Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 107-136.  
328
 D. Konstan, “To Hellenikon Ethnos: Ethnicity and the Construction of Ancient Greek Identity” in 
Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity, ed. I. Malkin, (Harvard: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2001), 30. 
329
 Ibid.  
330
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homeland for so long, and sheer exhausted, rather than a loathing of a foreign people, 
inspired the rise in violence. 
 
d. The Psychology of War-Weariness 
 
While “war-weariness” is an oversimplified term to describe a very complex set 
of emotions and reactions, it seems the most compact way of communicating the 
physical, spiritual, and psychological exhaustion expressed at the Hyphasis and enacted 
throughout Alexander’s many sieges. Curtius has Alexander assume the men’s hesitation 
is out of fear; the king encourages them and reminds them of past braveries, brushing 
aside worries over the size of armies in the Nanda kingdom beyond the Hyphasis or the 
number of elephants they might have (Curt. 9.2.19-26).  However, Coenus readily and 
directly corrects him: “If we are going on, we shall follow you…even though we be 
unarmed, naked and exhausted.” Coenus speaks not in anger or disloyalty, but his words 
are “wrung out…by dire necessity” (Curt. 9.3.5-6).  
In Arrian’s version of the speech, slightly different in rhetoric but thematically the 
same, Coenus goes a step further. He asks, “Do not lead [the men] onward now against 
their will! For you may find that unwilling combatants will not prove equally formidable 
in the field” (5.27.7). Romm criticizes Arrian’s rhetoric in both Alexander and Coenus’ 
speeches, suggesting that it is “ill-fitting” because “both king and officer knew well that 
the army’s long experience of battle was its greatest asset.”331 This is without a doubt the 
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truth, however Arrian, who would have commanded his own legion before achieving 
governorship of Cappadocia,
332
 would also be well aware that even the best-trained 
troops cannot be as enduring as Alexander’s siege equipment. There is a point wherein 
the fighting experience of men can no longer counterbalance their exhausted morale and 
unwillingness to combat the enemy. According to Arrian, Coenus argued that fresh 
recruits would serve Alexander better,
333
 understanding that morale was as important to 
an army’s success as its skill.334  According to Curtius,  Coenus made a similar argument: 
“[Your plans are] a program appropriate to your spirit, but beyond ours. For your valor 
will ever be on the increase, but our energy is already running out” (9.2.9).  
The men’s exhaustion and the brutal extremes of the war have changed them, as 
extensive battle does. Many of those with Alexander in India were veterans (Arr. 5.17.4), 
having crossed the Hellespont with him eight years prior in 334. The constant exposure to 
combat and violent death on this extended campaign was “without parallel before 
Alexander.”335 Before Alexander, sustained continuous conflict was unusual. The nearest 
parallel is Xenophon’s report of seven days of constant fighting through the land of the 
Carduchians,
336
 hardly comparable to Alexander’s veterans’ long records. Hanson notes 
that during the Classical Period, the average man would not have spent an extensive 
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amount of time fighting in battle, “not even comparable to one week of combat for an 
infantryman on patrol in Vietnam.”337 Alexander’s mode of war, on the other hand, was 
characterized by almost constant fighting. Even if his men only fought four major pitched 
battles, the bloody skirmishes and ambushes in Bactria, followed by constant sieges in 
India, would have been severely exhausting.
338
 The seemingly endless campaign in India 
exacerbated the naturally brutal tendencies of the Greek way of war (see pp. 17-18). 
However, the unbroken campaigning in India resulted in violence on a regular basis, 
whereas incidents of andrapodismos in earlier Greek warfare, like the Peloponnesian 
War, stood out as watersheds and occurred comparatively infrequently. The Macedonian 
army’s desire to return home after it turned westward at the Hyphasis rendered it more 
destructive because of haste.
339
  
Another modern comparison (considering testimony, rather than attempting any 
technical psychological evaluation) is a speech delivered by John Kerry in 1971, when he 
was the spokesperson for the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW).  Kerry 
appealed to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to end the campaign by 
speaking, like Coenus did, on behalf of the soldiers he represented. The U.S. had 
experienced only devastating failure in Vietnam, but its soldiers underwent a similar 
experience after prolonged exposure to violence. Kerry tells the committee that: 
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338
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339
  I agree with Bosworth only to a certain degree, and I will not argue that Alexander “gloried in battle 
and killing” to explain the rise of violence in India. It is impossible that Alexander was the only one to 
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this slaughter, and I do not find that the capacity for massacre originates in a personality defect or nuance 
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“Several months ago…over 150 honorably discharged, and many 
very highly decorated, veterans testified to war crimes committed 
in Southeast Asia. These were not isolated incidents, but crimes 
committed on a day to day basis with full awareness of officers at 
all levels of command.”340 
 
 
These soldiers were not green recruits, but, as Kerry pointed out, they were 
experienced enough to have been “highly decorated,” negating the explanation that they 
had gone mad with bloodlust or did not know how to conduct themselves in war. Kerry 
goes into greater detail about the atrocities in Vietnam than Arrian and Diodorus do in the 
sieges of the Malli, but a similar trend of behavior is recognizable in Alexander and his 
men. 
“[The veterans] told stories that at times they had personally raped, 
cut off ears, cut off heads…randomly shot at civilians, razed 
villages in fashion reminiscent of Genghis Khan, shot cattle and 
dogs for fun, poisoned food stocks, and generally ravaged the 
countryside of South Vietnam in addition to the normal ravage of 
war…”341 
 
 
Kerry explains the dangerous effects of sustained exposure to bloodshed, of how 
men are “taught to deal and to trade in violence” and “accepted very coolly a My Lai.”342 
He discusses this in terms of morality, which are applicable to modern history, but hardly 
to ancient. It is for this reason that I hesitate to carry the parallel further, understanding 
that morality is a social construct which is necessarily different across time and space. 
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Perceptions of war, too, have decidedly changed, and as Hanson notes, the percentage of 
Americans who have served in war is a minute fraction compared to the percentage of 
ancient Greeks. Nevertheless, the behavior of men in foreign territory (perhaps even in 
familiar territory, if one looks to the American Civil War), after prolonged exposure to 
and involvement in violent acts, cannot but alter their behavior. It was not merely their 
desire to return home that led the Macedonians to the enraged massacre of Indian 
civilians after prosecuting a difficult siege—indeed, if it were, violence would have 
tapered off after the Hyphasis, not increased—but a combination of concerns. Their 
disintegrating morale and armor, cultural isolation and a foreign, repetitive mode of 
fighting, and no end to the campaign in sight, led the soldiers’ aggravation to seek an 
outlet through violence. Knowing that they were returning west was not sufficient and did 
not immediately ameliorate the situation for the Macedonians. Rather,  tension in the 
army became more noticeable after the Hyphasis due to rising anxiety concerning 
Alexander’s increasingly risky behavior in battle,343 and in fact some of the worst 
slaughters enacted against the Indians were in response to fear for the king’s welfare. 
 
e. Alexander’s Wounds  
 
In Greek war, it was necessary for a king or general to be seen fighting in the 
front ranks.
344
 A general’s “magnet” presence was key to soldiers’ willingness to fight, 
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and a king’s presence would be especially potent, as strong leadership was imperative to 
overcoming the “enormous physical and psychological pressures of battle.”345 
Alexander’s position was difficult because he was both strategos and basileus, and 
balancing the two roles was essential. To direct from behind was the duty of neither 
general nor king, but Alexander’s risk taking, especially at Malli, jeopardized his 
kingdom and the good order of his army. However, this is part and parcel of the king-
general tradition of Macedonia. As Worthington notes, Philip himself had a long list of 
brave battle exploits tied in with his role as king. Philip “never forgot what his duties as a 
king were” and “for the pursuit of his own glory and especially for that of his kingdom” 
Philip “lost an eye, shattered a collarbone, and suffered a near fatal wound that maimed a 
leg and made him limp for the rest of his life” with no reluctance.346 This kingly practice 
of suffering with one’s men and asking nothing of them one would not do oneself has 
substantial precedent in Macedonia, though to note, the difference between Philip’s risk 
taking and Alexander’s was the presence of an heir. Philip had Alexander (and 
Arrhidaeus), but Alexander in the land of the Malli had no one.   
Not all of the wounds Alexander incurred were serious or the product of any 
excessively risky behavior, but they did sometimes contribute to a violent reaction in his 
men. Along the River Choes, Alexander was shot in his shoulder (Arr. 4.23.3), at 
Massaga, he was struck in the ankle with an arrow (Arr. 4.26.4), at the Hydaspes possibly 
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wounded by Porus’ son,347 and at the siege of the Malli he was wounded almost fatally in 
the chest (Arr. 6.10.1-2). At a siege along the River Choes in 427, Alexander’s army 
hastened after escaping Indians because it was enraged over the king’s wound.348 At 
Malli, the army believed Alexander dead and massacred the entire population in revenge 
(Arr. 6.10.3-6.11.1) This latter example emphasizes both the tension of the army 
regarding Alexander’s well-being as well as its utter exhaustion and demoralization, 
which was ostensibly the cause for the king’s self-endangerment.  
In the territory of the Malli, which lays at the confluence of the Hydaspes and 
Hydraotes, Alexander and his army were met with strong resistance in 325. After 
repelling 50,000 enemy troops, the Macedonian army pursued them to nearby 
strongholds (Arr. 6.8.6-8). While besieging these strongholds, Alexander supposedly 
observed his men hesitating to attack. In response, Arrian says that the king αὐτός δέ 
προσέβαλλεν τῷ τείχει (6.6.4) (attacked the wall himself) in order to instill shame in the 
soldiers for their reticence.
349
 On the following day at the second siege in Malli, Arrian 
reported that “suspecting that the Macedonians bringing the ladders were shirking 
(βλακεύειν), Alexander snatched a ladder from one of them….and ascended it himself” 
(Arr. 6.9.3). In this case, Alexander’s haste had almost deadly results, but in both 
instances we see a Macedonian hesitance to advance and risk injury or death now that a 
return home was guaranteed, or perhaps only Alexander’s perception that they were 
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unwilling to fight after they had already spoken out against continuing the campaign. In 
either case, the king’s behavior inspired terror in his men because of the physical danger 
into which he flung himself, and their response to the threat of his death was 
unhesitatingly ferocious.  It was a serious enough issue that his generals rebuked him for 
it.
350
 After the second siege of Malli, Craterus visited a recuperating Alexander and urged 
him not to risk his life so easily when so many men depended upon it, emphasizing the 
troops’ anxiety over Alexander’s wellbeing, allegedly asking, “Who wishes to survive 
you? Who is able?” (Curt. 9.6.9). 
During this second siege of the Malli, Arrian reports that “those who saw 
Alexander…leaping into the citadel were roused by devotion and fear that the king might 
suffer harm in taking senseless risks” (6.10.3-6.11.1). Arrian’s account emphasizes 
perhaps as much his own opinion of Alexander’s decision as the Macedonians’, but 
nonetheless pinpoints the cause of their desperate fighting even after Alexander’s was 
borne out on a shield. Diodorus describes Alexander’s decision to enter the citadel alone 
as “little expected” (17.99.1), and perhaps the king’s technique startled the army into 
action because fear, rather than embarrassment. The accounts of Diodorus, Curtius, and 
Arrian all agree that the Macedonians responded “in a fury at the injury to their king” 
(Diod. 17.99.4), and believing him dead they tore the city apart and spared none (Curt. 
9.5.19-21).
 351
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This is more than vengeance; it is sheer terror. If Alexander had died, then his 
troops would have been far from the center of the empire, farther still from Macedonia, 
and without a king, heir, or viable leader, “since a great many officers were held in equal 
esteem by both Alexander himself and the Macedonians” (Arr. 6.12.2). Indeed, there was 
great rivalry among Alexander’s generals which emerged at once upon his death in 
Babylon in 323 and lasted for forty-seven years in a series of Diadoch Wars (323-276).
352
 
During the king’s lifetime, this strife emerged between Craterus and Hephaistion, who 
brawled publically in India (Plut. Alex. 47.9-12) and were frequently so at odds that 
Alexander separated them, even having them march along opposite banks of the 
Hydaspes (Arr. 6.2.2).
353
 After Musicanus’ rebellion in 325, Alexander put his land 
forces under the command of Hephaistion and Peithon along the Indus, and Craterus was 
sent to escort retired veterans to Carmania (Arr. 6.17.3-4). However, Alexander was 
wounded in Malli before Craterus was sent back, and the rivalries of the generals and the 
lack of an individual capable of taking charge of the army uncontested inspired great 
anxiety. Craterus appeared to have been aware of this, reminding Alexander that “we 
have reached a place from which returning home without your leadership is impossible 
for any of us” (Curt. 9.6.9). That “the entire army raised a wail” when the men thought 
Alexander dead is not surprising. Along with what was very likely a genuine mourning 
because the Macedonians found themselves isolated and uncertain of how they might 
return home, surrounded as they were by many hostile enemy tribes (Arr. 6.12.1-3). 
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f. Cultural Isolation  
 
Revolt did indeed occur among “the Greeks who had been settled in Bactria and 
Sogdiana, who had long borne unhappily their sojourn among peoples of another race” 
when they received word that Alexander had died from his injuries (Diod. 17.99.5). The 
willingness of these settlers to riot so readily is suggestive of the same problem 
Alexander’s army faced: cultural and physical isolation. In this regard, India was unique, 
as “the coterie of Greek intellectuals which had followed [Alexander] to Central Asia” as 
well as his Hellenized headquarters were separated from him and did not follow him into 
India.
354
 Alexander left his court at Bactria and further split his forces into five parts 
(Hephaistion, Ptolemy, Perdiccas, Coenus with Artabazus, and Alexander himself) in 
328, and this “depletion of staff” further increased the sensation of isolation.355 In 
response, there emerged a growing need to locate the familiar within the foreign, best 
exemplified by the Macedonians’ willingness to accept the legends of Nysa’s origins; 
seeing familiar vegetation like ivy and Mt. “Meros”356 must have brought comfort to 
them.
357
  
 Nonetheless, the Bacchic revelries of Nysa could have compensated for the 
onslaught of the unfamiliar which the army faced. India was a land of myth upon entry, 
and while fox-sized ants never materialized (Hdt. 3.102; 3.104),  the Macedonians did 
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encounter monstrously large serpents, pythons reaching a length of sixteen cubits 
(twenty-four feet) long, and monkeys capable of imitating human expressions and 
behavior (Diod. 17.90.1-3). Apes and parrots—birds able to adopt human speech—might 
have been wonders, but not terrors (Arr. Ind. 15.8-10). Smaller snakes, however, were. 
Diodorus describes a “multitude” of them, variously colored and some with “thick, 
shaggy crests” (17.90.6) whose bite induced fearful pains and a bloody sweat. Curtius 
reports that a bite would lead to instant death (9.1.12), and it is not surprising that men 
took to pitching camp in the trees, slinging hammocks between trunks to avoid being 
bitten while asleep and “remained awake most of the night” (Diod. 17.90.7). The danger 
from snakes was serious, as Arrian reports from Nearchus that Alexander hired local 
physicians to travel with the army and “had it announced in camp that anyone bitten by a 
snake should go straight to the royal tent” (Ind. 15.11). Other diseases common to the 
region, dysentery and likely malaria, were less easily remedied, and a number of men 
died from them.
358
 Faced with not only unfamiliar battle and the drudgery of perpetual 
sieges, the Macedonian army was threatened too by their natural surroundings, and the 
rebellions against satraps after Alexander’s death only highlight this.  
 
g. Rebellions of Settlers  
 
The men settled in India (and Bactria) were not content to live there. Coenus 
points out that “those [Greeks] who have been settled in the cities you founded do not 
remain there entirely of their own will” (Arr. 5.27.5). These men suffered from cultural 
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isolation, and perhaps more significantly, the promise of the unending labor of defense 
and pacification. In the north-west, where Nicanor oversaw local governments from the 
Parapamisidae to the Indus, the natives refused Macedonian rule, and the satrap was 
finally assassinated by his own subjects.
359
 In the north, Philip son of Machatas kept 
watch over the Taxila region, but his Thracian mercenary troops rose up against him and 
killed him once Alexander was en route to Carmania in 325. The king did not send a 
replacement, but left Eudamus, an apparently more trustworthy captain of a Thracian 
contingent, to garrison the territory until someone could be sent (Arr. 6.27.2). Alexander 
died before he could dispatch anyone, and Indian opposition remained strong, making the 
Greek cities founded there as unsafe as they were unlivable for westerners, serious 
damaged by months of monsoon rains.
360
  By 321, after Alexander’s death when he had 
taken over Philip son of Machatas’ satrapy, Peithon was forced to cede territory east of 
the Indus to Chandragupta, whose guerilla tactics against him revealed the persistency of 
Indian opposition.
361
 
In 325 at Patala, Alexander found the region depopulated and brought civilians 
back with a promise of clemency. Nonetheless, as soon as Alexander marched away, the 
admiral Nearchus’ fleet was attacked by locals and forced to disembark early.362 The 
rebellion and refusal to recognize local authority was a constant problem, and only Porus 
and Taxiles appear to have had success in preventing it, because they ensured continuity 
and consistency with local traditions. The extent to which the two rajas were controlled 
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by the Macedonian satrap Eudamus is questionable, and to their own people, they 
remained monarchs.
363
 On the local level little had changed, and “the Indian territories 
were now virtually ceded to the two native princes.”364  The impossibility of maintaining 
willing Greek and Macedonian populations in India and the revolts Macedonian satraps 
suffered there echo resistance at the Hyphasis, and one can imagine that their complaints 
might have been similar as well. Even if the settlers did not have a “longing for the 
homeland” (Arr. 5.27.6), they clearly did not wish to dwell in the radically foreign world 
of India.  
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Conclusion 
 
The Alexander Romance credits Alexander with space travel as well as the first 
recorded deep sea exploration and use of a submarine.
365
 While these accounts are clearly 
fantastical, it is not surprising that Alexander was the core around which such legendary 
stories arose. This dynamic and young Macedonian king created a larger empire in his 
thirteen year reign than any other western ruler before him, spreading Hellenism where 
his army travelled, and manufacturing a new, personal form of a kingship to manage a 
multi-cultural realm.  
However, the process of expansion and conquest took a heavy toll on the army. 
We have seen how resistance in Bactria, Sogdiana, and India affected the Macedonian 
way of fighting and decimated the morale of the troops. The traditions of Greek warfare 
that had held sway for centuries had to be altered to face the guerilla tactics of the 
Scythian and the Sogdians as well as the endless sieges of India.  Bactria and Sogdiana 
were intractable lands whose topography facilitated enemy use of ambushes and 
encirclement, and Spitamenes’ Scythian allies proved to be one of the Macedonians’ 
most difficult enemies to defeat.  Indians fought with chariots, toxic weapons, and war 
elephants, and they frequently fled their citadels to take up defense elsewhere, which 
made the maintenance of a static, controlled population impossible. In neither region did 
the capture of a fortress or capital city guarantee the submission of surrounding lands, 
resulting in frequent doubling-back in Bactria and Sogdiana, and constant sieges in India.  
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As a result the Macedonians fought against individuals who had been combating them for 
years, from whom likely the majority of surviving soldiers had received some sort of 
siege-related injury. The explosion of violence that followed was the outcome of 
escalating animosity and utter exhaustion on the part of the soldiers who were unable, as 
Coenus said at the Hyphasis, to match Alexander’s perpetual energy and desire to press 
onward (Curt. 9.2.9).  
Alexander’s policies of conquest also sharpened the degree of viciousness in the 
invasion. Learning that satraps could not be successfully installed in Bactria and 
Sogdiana as they had been in Persia, Alexander forcibly settled natives there and put 
them under the watch of garrisons. Such a high degree of interference in regional 
government had not been customary under the Great King, and the establishment of 
military outposts only intensified local resistance. In India a fierce local sense of 
autonomy meant there was a need to win every major city or fortress in the region, either 
by surrender or by siege, with the result that Macedonian conquest was piecemeal and 
gradual. The Brahmanic resistance of Western India complicated matters by infusing the 
Indian revolt with a moral and religious undertone which transformed Alexander’s killing 
of resisters into a massacre of holy men and only stiffened opposition in other areas. 
Throughout the campaign the disparity between Alexander’s goals and those of 
his troops increased. The Macedonian army that Philip had forged and which Alexander 
had honed was not incapable of conquest beyond the Hydaspes River. It was unwilling. 
Thinned out by eight years of marching, fighting, and securing and expanding borders, 
Alexander’s men in India were affected by enervation and cultural isolation. They 
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traveled through the inhospitable climate of an alien land, donning foreign clothes while 
their own armor visibly deteriorated and fell off around them.  The march back West 
from the Hyphasis River was the bloodiest because the men had the most to lose. The 
Macedonians were finally departing from India, and securing it against revolt meant they 
would not have to return. Tensions between generals and concern for the king’s life and 
increasingly risky behavior in battle ran deep when a return to the West was at hand.  It is 
for this reason that the bloodiest act of the campaign occurred during the march out of 
India at the siege of Multan, after Alexander’s almost fatal injury. This apex of the Indian 
campaign’s violence was touched off by the army’s terror at Alexander’s wound, but the 
wholesale slaughter of the population was a frustrated response to the entire campaign. 
The circumstance of the siege prompted Curtius to write that “Whoever met [the 
soldiers], they believed to be the person by whom the king had been wounded. And at 
length by the slaughter of the enemy they appeased their just anger” (9.5.20).   
It was not a love of killing for its own sake that drove the Macedonians to such 
limits, but a campaign whose duration, enemies, and forms of combat were not 
compatible with the traditions of Greek warfare. The shift the army experienced from 
skirmishing and pitched battles to sieges and cutting down rebels in flight did not occur at 
once, but in gradual stages and by necessity. Just as Alexander’s campaign in the East 
transformed the Greek world and opened up East to West, so the invaders’ experiences in 
Bactria and Sogdiana altered the nature of their fighting in India, which came to be 
characterized by a sense of isolation, exhaustion, and brutality. 
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